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TO DISCHARGE OR NOT TO DISCHARGE: 
TAX IS THE QUESTION 
ABSTRACT 
Prior to Congress passing BAPCPA in 2005, an individual was able to 
discharge debt related to a tax return filed after April 15th as long as that 
individual satisfied the Beard test and certain statutory requirements. Courts 
applied the Beard test, which consists of four factors, to determine when a 
document qualified as a valid tax return. Of these four factors, the fourth 
factor, which requires that the debtor make an honest and reasonable attempt 
to comply with the tax law, led to disputes among courts. All circuit courts 
adopted the Beard test, and the major issue prior to the 2005 amendments 
turned on whether an individual can satisfy the fourth factor of the Beard test if 
that individual failed to file a tax return until after the IRS had already filed a 
tax return on that individual’s behalf.  
In an attempt to clarify the language of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress 
defined the term “return” in its 2005 amendments. The definition appears in 
the hanging paragraph of § 523(a). Importantly, Congress stated that a 
document is a return if the document “satisfies the requirements of applicable 
bankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements).” In 2012, the Fifth 
Circuit found in In re McCoy that the date on which a tax form is filed is one 
of the “applicable filing requirements” that Congress was referencing in the 
hanging paragraph. Thus, the Fifth Circuit created the “one-day-late rule” 
when it held that a tax form filed one day late is not a valid tax return because 
the filer has failed to satisfy applicable filing requirements. The result of the 
one-day-late interpretation is that an individual who files a tax form late 
cannot receive a discharge of debt stemming from that late-filed form. The 
Tenth and First Circuits subsequently adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation. 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, bankruptcy courts, academics, and the IRS 
oppose the one-day-late interpretation and have offered an alternative 
viewpoint. Courts opposing the one-day-late rule are concerned with the harsh 
impact that the one-day-late interpretation has on honest debtors who file tax 
forms late for reasons beyond the debtor’s control. While various courts 
opposing the one-day-late rule have interpreted the hanging paragraph in 
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slightly different ways, the common theme among these opinions is that a late-
filed tax form can still qualify as a return if the filer satisfied the Beard test and 
statutory requirements. Courts opposing the one-day-late rule maintain that 
Congress did not intend for the hanging paragraph to displace the Beard test. 
This Comment argues that Congress intended to codify the Beard test 
through the BAPCPA amendments. Under this interpretation, the fourth 
element of the Beard test requires that a court must always review a late-filed 
tax form and make a subjective determination as to whether that form is a 
return. The court must evaluate all relevant factors, including when the form 
was filed, why it was filed late, and whether the IRS has filed a substitute 
return on behalf of the individual who failed to file a timely return. This 
interpretation allows the debtor an opportunity to show a reason for filing late 
tax forms, and gives the court the opportunity to make a determination as to 
the validity of the debtor’s reasoning. Ultimately, this interpretation allows 
debtors to receive a fresh start without compromising the IRS’s ability to 
collect taxes. 
INTRODUCTION 
April 15th, also known as “Tax Day” to most Americans, has been the date 
by which individuals earning an income are expected to file their income tax 
returns since 1955. Depending on whom you ask, Congress changed tax day 
from its original February date to March, and finally April, in an effort to 
either spread out the IRS’s workload or as a means of avoiding paying interest 
on tax returns.1 While April 15th is technically tax day, this date is often not 
the final date by which an individual must file his or her tax return without 
penalty. The IRS has moved tax day for various reasons including extensions, 
natural disasters, and holidays,2 and the IRS has the discretion to waive 
penalties related to late-filed tax forms.3 Whether an individual does so 
 
 1 See Jessica Sung, Why is Tax Day April 15?, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2002), at 64, http://archive.fortune. 
com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/04/15/321414/index.htm. 
 2 See Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Announces 2016 Filing Season Start Date – and a Delayed Tax Day, 
FORBES (Dec. 21, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2015/12/21/irs-announces-
2016-filing-season-start-date-and-a-delayed-tax-day/#314e3802336a (noting tax day is on April 18, 2016 due 
to emancipation day); Tax Relief in Disaster Situations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Relief-in-Disaster-
Situations (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (outlining the IRS’s list of natural disasters that have affected tax day). 
 3 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (2012) (“In case of failure to file any return . . . on the date prescribed therefor, 
unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be 
added to the amount required. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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strategically, unintentionally, or out of desperation, the late-filing of tax forms 
are a common occurrence in America.4 Since Congress passed the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) in 2005, the 
question of whether debt arising from these late-filed tax forms is 
dischargeable in chapter 7 has become an issue. 
This Comment will analyze the one-day-late rule, which states that tax debt 
arising from a late-filed tax form is nondischargeable in bankruptcy.5 Further, 
this analysis will show that the one-day-late rule is a flawed interpretation of 
§ 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). Section 523(a) states: “A 
discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt—for a tax . . . with respect to which a return, or 
equivalent report or notice, if required—was not filed or given.”6 This issue, 
therefore, turns on whether a late-filed tax form can be considered a valid tax 
return because an individual can only receive a discharge for tax debt if the 
individual filed a valid tax return. 
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, the term “return,” as used in § 523(a), 
was left undefined by the statute.7 Inconsistencies regarding various courts’ 
definitions of “return” led to the development of the four-part Beard test.8 The 
Beard test classified a document as a return when the document: “(1) purported 
to be a return; (2) [was] executed by the debtor under penalty of perjury; (3) 
contain[ed] sufficient data to allow calculation of the tax; and (4) represent[ed] 
an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law.”9 
Of these factors, the fourth factor was the most important, leading to disputes 
among the circuit courts.10 Although courts reached varying conclusions on 
 
 4 See Brian O’Connell, Why Do So Many People Fall Behind On Their Taxes?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 12, 
2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/021214/why-do-so-many-people-fall-
behind-their-taxes.asp (“In 2009 a spokesperson for the U.S. Internal Revenue Service estimated that 8.2 
million Americans owed over $83 billion in back taxes, penalties and interest.”). 
 5 See Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2015); Mallo v. IRS 
(In re Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313, 1328 (10th Cir. 2014); McCoy v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n (In re McCoy), 666 
F.3d 924, 932 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 6 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 7 See Maitland v. N.J., Div. of Taxation (In re Maitland), 531 B.R. 516, 518 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). 
 8 See Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934); Beard v. Comm’r, 793 F.2d 139, 139 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (per curiam), aff’g 82 T.C. 766 (1984); see also Hamer v. IRS (In re Hamer), 328 B.R. 825, 828, 
832 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2005). 
 9 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 518, 526 n.13 (citing Beard, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139 
(6th Cir. 1986)). 
 10 In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1058–59 (7th Cir. 2005) (identifying the issues with the “honest and 
reasonable” standard). 
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what constituted “an honest and reasonable attempt” to satisfy the tax law 
requirements, all circuits adopted the Beard test for determining when a 
chapter 7 debtor’s late-filed tax forms were a return.11 
Congress’s decision to define the term “return” in the BAPCPA 
amendments, however, threatened the future of the Beard test.12 This definition 
appears after § 523(a)(19)(B), and the majority of courts refer to the definition 
as the “hanging paragraph.”13 The hanging paragraph states: 
For purposes of this subsection, the term “return” means a return that 
satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including 
applicable filing requirements). Such term includes a return prepared 
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or 
similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or 
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include 
a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, or a similar state or local law.14 
Although Congress did not clarify which filing requirements are “applicable,” 
debtors who have outstanding tax debt at the time they file a chapter 7 petition 
are the parties that this legislation has truly affected.15 
Congress’s definition of “return” led courts to reach two different 
conclusions when interpreting what constitutes a return for dischargeability 
purposes. The courts following the Fifth Circuit’s holding in McCoy v. 
 
 11 See, e.g., id. at 1057; Moroney v. United States (In re Moroney), 352 F.3d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 12 11 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ TX12.039[2][a][ii] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th 
ed.). 
 13 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). Many courts have adopted the * to refer to the hanging paragraph, and I 
will use this identifying language throughout this Comment. Furthermore, the term “hanging paragraph” in this 
Comment will refer to § 523(a)(*), not the other “hanging paragraph,” which follows and addresses 
§ 1325(a)(9): whether a debtor can strip down the lien of a secured creditor under the terms of § 1325(a)(9) 
when the collateral is a motor vehicle purchased by the debtor for personal use within 910 days of the filing of 
the petition. See id. § 1325(a)(9); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269, 271 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
 14 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). “Section 6020(a) returns are those in which a taxpayer who has failed to file his 
or her returns on time nonetheless discloses all information necessary for the IRS to prepare a substitute return 
that the taxpayer can then sign and submit.” In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 2012). “[A] § 6020(b) 
return is one in which the taxpayer submits either no information or fraudulent information, and the IRS 
prepares a substitute [for] return [‘SFR’] based on the best information it can collect independently.” Id.  
 15 11 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ TX12.039[2][a][ii]. 
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Mississippi State Tax Commission (In re McCoy)16 found that a tax debt 
resulting from a tax form filed even one day late is not dischargeable because 
timely filing is a part of the “applicable filing requirements” discussed in the 
hanging paragraph.17 Proponents of the one-day-late rule are not concerned 
with the reason that the debtor filed his tax forms late because, under this view, 
a late-filed tax form can never be a valid return for dischargeability purposes 
unless the form is “prepared pursuant to section 6020(a).”18 A § 6020(a) return 
is a late-filed tax form prepared by the IRS with the assistance of the individual 
who failed to file a timely return.19 Unlike a § 6020(b) return, which is 
prepared by the IRS without assistance from the filer and will be discussed 
later, Congress stated in the hanging paragraph that § 6020(a) forms are still 
valid despite the fact that they are always filed after April 15th.20 Additionally, 
the IRS has full discretion to allow or deny an individual the opportunity to file 
a return under § 6020(a) if that individual has failed to file a timely return.21 
The practical result of the one-day-late rule is that an individual cannot 
receive a discharge on any tax debt resulting from a late-filed tax form unless 
the IRS chooses to allow the individual to file a § 6020(a) return.22 While the 
First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have all issued opinions subscribing to this 
view, the logic behind the one-day-late rule has led to questions about the 
seemingly harsh impact that this policy has on many debtors.23 For example, in 
Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), the Tenth Circuit specifically held that courts do 
not need to evaluate whether a debtor made an honest and reasonable attempt 
to satisfy the requirements of the tax law because filing deadline dates are part 
 
 16 666 F.3d at 932 (holding that because the debtor’s 1998 and 1998 returns were filed late, they did not 
constitute “returns” for discharge purposes). The rule established in In re McCoy will be hereinafter referred to 
as the “one-day-late rule.” 
 17 See, e.g., In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1328 (10th Cir. 
2014). See generally In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (“[The debtor’s] 1998 and 1999 returns did not comply 
with the filing requirements of applicable Mississippi tax law and were, therefore, not ‘returns’ for discharge 
purposes.”). 
 18 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). 
 19 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 928 (“Section 6020(a) returns are those in which a taxpayer who has 
failed to file his or her returns on time nonetheless discloses all information necessary for the IRS to prepare a 
substitute return that the taxpayer can then sign and submit.”). 
 20 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). 
 21 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(a) (2012). 
 22 See, e.g., In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1328 (holding that debt resulting from a late-filed 1040 federal tax 
return was not dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (holding that debt resulting from a 
late-filed state tax return was not dischargeable in bankruptcy). 
 23 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1327; In re McCoy, 666 
F.3d at 931. 
SAHAROVICH GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/15/2016 3:13 PM 
224 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 33 
of the applicable filing requirements that Congress discussed in the hanging 
paragraph.24 While Congress never mentioned displacing the Beard test in the 
BAPCPA amendments, the one-day-late rule is, in effect, a complete departure 
from the Beard test.25 
The second group of courts, which includes the Ninth Circuit, various 
district courts, and bankruptcy courts, have held that a late-filed tax form can 
be a return, and the debt can be dischargeable as long as the Beard test and 
applicable Code requirements have been met.26 Two further splits exist among 
the courts holding that a late-filed tax form can be a return. While some courts 
opposing the one-day-late rule have held that a debt resulting from a late-filed 
tax form is only dischargeable if the individual seeking a discharge filed tax 
forms prior to the IRS filing a § 6020(b) substitute return27 on the taxpayer’s 
behalf, other courts have held that a debt stemming from a late-filed return 
may be dischargeable even after the IRS files a § 6020(b) substitute return.28 
Additionally, the latter group of courts is further split regarding what 
additional factors a court must look at to determine if an individual has 
complied with the fourth prong of the Beard test.29  
 
 24 In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1320. 
 25 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 521, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). 
 26 See Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), 828 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 
13, 2016) (No. 16-497); In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 521; McBride v. City of Kettering (In re McBride), 534 
B.R. 326, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015); Martin v. IRS (In re Martin) (Martin I), 508 B.R. 717, 736 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); Rhodes v. United States (In 
re Rhodes), 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013). At the time of publication, the Supreme Court had not 
yet accepted or rejected the petition for certiorari in In re Smith. 
 27 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b)(1) (2012). Section 6020(b) forms are late-filed tax forms filed by the IRS on 
behalf of an individual with no confirmation or signature from the individual filer. See id. 
 28 Compare Pitts v. United States (In re Pitts), 497 B.R. 73, 81 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that “if 
the late return was filed prior to any assessment by the IRS, then the taxes would be dischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(1)(B)”), aff’d, 515 B.R. 317 (C.D. Cal. 2014), with Martin I, 508 B.R. at 731 (“[T]he Court is 
persuaded that the most reasonable and consistent interpretation of the hanging paragraph comes from the 
minority no time-limit-approach, derived from the Eighth Circuit’s Pre-BAPCPA decision in Colsen also 
applying the Beard test.”). 
 29 Compare United States v. Martin (In re Martin) (Martin II), 542 B.R. 479, 491 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the court must look at the “number of missing returns, the length of the delay, the reasons for the 
delay, and any other circumstances reasonably pertaining to the honesty and reasonableness of the [debtor’s] 
efforts”), with Briggs v. IRS (In re Briggs), 511 B.R. 707, 719 (Bankr. N.D. GA. 2014) (“The focus on the 
‘honest and reasonable’ inquiry under the Beard test should therefore be whether the debtor’s filing represents 
his honest attempt to reasonably convey accurate information regarding the debtor’s wages, deductions, and 
allowances.”). 
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Therefore, three viewpoints exist among the courts opposing the one-day-
late rule: (1) a late filed tax form can only be a return if the form is filed prior 
to the IRS filing a § 6020(b) substitute return on the filer’s behalf;30 (2) the IRS 
filing a § 6020(b) return is one of many factors that a court must consider when 
determining if a late filed form is a return;31 and (3) the IRS filing a § 6020(b) 
return has no effect on this determination, and a late-filed form is a return if the 
document is useful to the IRS at the time of filing.32 
The three viewpoints opposing the one-day-late rule center around the ideas 
that the BAPCPA amendments should not displace the Beard test, and that 
Congress’s definition of “return” is harmonious with the pre-BAPCPA Beard 
test.33 These courts agree that a late-filed tax form can meet the definition of a 
return in certain situations. For example, in Maitland v. New Jersey, Division 
of Taxation (In re Maitland), the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court held that a 
debtor’s tax documents, which were filed one year late, constituted a return 
because the debtor satisfied the four elements of the Beard test.34 The court 
based its opinion on both the rules of statutory interpretation and Judge 
Easterbrook’s dissent in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Payne.35 While 
the majority in In re Payne did not rely on the language in the hanging 
paragraph (because the debt in question arose prior to the effective date of 
BAPCPA),36 Judge Easterbrook used his dissent to explain that late-filed forms 
are still “returns” before he correctly predicted that the language in the 
BAPCPA amendments will lead courts to preclude debts arising from these 
returns from dischargeability.37 Following In re Payne, many courts opposing 
the one-day-late rule have relied on Judge Easterbrook’s idea that “[j]udges 
 
 30 See In re Pitts, 497 B.R. at 83–84. 
 31 See Martin II, 542 B.R. at 490–91. 
 32 See In re Briggs, 511 B.R. at 715, 719. 
 33 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); see also Martin I, 508 B.R. at 731; In re 
Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013). 
 34 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 520. 
 35 See id. (discussing Judge Easterbrook’s dissent from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Payne, 431 
F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
 36 When evaluating the various court decisions on this topic, it is important to remember that any holding 
involving a bankruptcy petition filed before the effective date of BAPCPA (October 17, 2005) was not 
analyzed under the language of the hanging paragraph. 
 37 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“After the 2005 legislation, an 
untimely return can not lead to a discharge—recall that the new language refers to ‘applicable nonbankruptcy 
law (including applicable filing requirements).’ But to say that a document came too late to allow a discharge 
in cases commenced after October 2005 (when the amendment took effect) is not to say that it wasn’t a 
‘return’ in 1992, when [a debtor] filed it, or for that matter today.”). 
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should not fiddle with the definition of ‘return’ so that one word covers all 
important steps in a system of self-assessment”38 to support the notion that 
Congress intended for the hanging paragraph’s definition of “return” to be a 
codified version of the long-standing Beard test.39  
Although Congress passed the BAPCPA amendments in an effort to clarify 
certain ambiguities within the Code, there is no evidence that Congress 
intended to impose a strict temporal deadline that would cost struggling 
Americans the ability to discharge their income tax debts in bankruptcy. 
Ultimately, the one-day-late interpretation is flawed, largely due to the 
unnecessarily harsh result that it has on honest, law-abiding debtors. Courts 
following the one-day-late interpretation are punishing debtors, who previously 
would have had access to a discharge, without any consideration as to the 
reasoning behind the debtor’s late filing. It is commonly understood that the 
purpose of bankruptcy is “to grant a fresh start to the ‘honest but unfortunate 
debtor.’”40 “When a dispute [regarding § 523] arises, these exceptions to 
discharge should be strictly construed against the creditor in light of the ‘fresh 
start’ policy underlying the Code.”41 Although it may not be possible in every 
debtor’s case, American courts have long applied these principles when 
interpreting the Code.42  
The issue that this Comment addresses should be resolved through an 
evaluation of Congress’s intent in light of the purpose of bankruptcy in 
America. As a result, this Comment argues that the court’s analysis in United 
States v. Martin (In re Martin) (“Martin II”), which was recently adopted by 
the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), is the correct interpretation of 
the hanging paragraph and proposes an amendment to § 523(a)(*) that will 
help clarify Congress’s definition of “return.”43 
 
 38 Id. at 1061. 
 39 See Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006); In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 
at 520; In re McBride, 534 B.R. 326, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015). 
 40 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy law] gives to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for the future, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of preexisting debt.”); In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 521 (citing Marrama v. Citizens Bank 
of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007)). 
 41 Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 722–23 (Bankr. E.D. Cal 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); see also In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 42 See Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244–45. 
 43 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 488–91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Beard test still applies 
following the BAPCPA amendments); see also In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2016), petition 
for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) (No. 16-497). 
SAHAROVICH GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/15/2016 3:13 PM 
2016] TO DISCHARGE OR NOT TO DISCHARGE 227 
BACKGROUND 
I. DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT STEMMING FROM LATE-FILED TAX FORMS 
PRIOR TO BAPCPA 
Prior to BAPCPA, many debtors were able to discharge tax debt in chapter 
7 as long as they satisfied certain rules. Under the pre-BAPCPA rules, the 
majority of courts allowed for an individual to discharge debt resulting from a 
late-filed, non-fraudulent tax form when the Beard test44 and the following four 
statutory requirements were met: (1) three years had passed from the time that 
the tax return leading to the debt was due;45 (2) the tax return was filed more 
than two years prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy petition;46 (3) at least 240 days 
had passed since the date of an IRS assessment;47 and (4) the individual filing 
the return had not engaged in a willful attempt to evade the tax law.48 The 
central issue before the BAPCPA amendments turned on the question of 
whether an individual’s late-filed tax forms could comply with the fourth 
prong of the Beard test, which required an honest attempt to satisfy the 
requirements of the tax law, if the individual filed the form after the IRS 
already assessed that individual’s tax liability.49 
A. The Post-Assessment Issue 
Before Congress passed the BAPCPA amendments in 2005, the majority of 
courts agreed that a late-filed tax form could be a “return” for § 523(a) 
purposes if the Beard test was satisfied.50 Further, the majority of courts found 
 
 44 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 518 (stating that the Beard test classified a document as a return when 
the document “(1) purport[ed] to be a return; (2) [was] executed by the debtor under penalty of perjury; (3) 
contain[ed] sufficient data to allow calculation of the tax; and (4) represent[ed] an honest and reasonable 
attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law”). 
 45 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B) (2012). 
 46 See id. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 47 See id. § 523(a)(1)(A). 
 48 See id. § 523(a)(1)(C); see also Donald A. Ariail et al., Discharging Taxes in Bankruptcy, J. 
ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 2010, at 58, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/aug/20102591.html. 
 49 See, e.g., United States v. Klein (In re Klein), 312 B.R. 443, 447 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“The question 
considered by the Bankruptcy Court here relates to the [h]onest and [r]easonable [a]ttempt prong of the Beard 
test. The narrow issue is whether Appellee’s 1990 and 1991 1040 Forms, filed after the IRS prepared SFRs 
and assessed taxes (‘post-assessment’), constitute an honest and reasonable attempt by Appellee to satisfy the 
requirements of the tax law.”); United States v. Ralph (In re Ralph), 266 B.R. 217, 220 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“The 
dispute in this case revolves around whether the Forms 1040EZ filed by Debtor Donna Ralph in 1995 
constitute an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law.”). 
 50 In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing circuits that have adopted the Beard test). 
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that debt arising from a late-filed return was dischargeable in cases where the 
debtor made an honest and reasonable attempt to file his or her own return 
prior to the IRS filing a substitute return on the debtor’s behalf.51 Circuit courts 
that dealt with late-filed tax forms filed prior to an assessment disagreed, 
however, as to when a debtor’s late-filed return constituted an honest and 
reasonable attempt to satisfy the tax law.52 Further, a split exists among circuit 
courts regarding whether tax debt stemming from a tax form filed after the IRS 
already assessed a debtor’s liability constituted as an honest and reasonable 
attempt. 
An IRS assessment is a determination of how much an individual taxpayer 
owes in taxes and penalties.53 This assessment typically occurs immediately 
after an individual files his or her own tax return.54 In cases where an 
individual has failed to file a timely return, the IRS will send a notice alerting 
the individual of his or her failure to file.55 If the individual responds to the 
notice, the IRS has discretion to allow the individual, with assistance of the 
IRS, to file a § 6020(a) return.56 If the individual does not respond to the 
notice, the IRS will eventually prepare a § 6020(b) substitute return on behalf 
of that individual.57 The IRS will then notify the individual of the § 6020(b) 
substitute return.58 At this point, the IRS recommends that the debtor file tax 
forms even after a § 6020(b) form is filed on the debtor’s behalf because “[t]he 
IRS will generally adjust your account to reflect the correct figures.”59 Finally, 
if the individual does not respond to the notice or execute the § 6020(b) 
substitute return the IRS prepared, the IRS will assess the individual’s liability 
based on any data that the IRS has access to at that time.60 Following 
 
 51 See In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We hold then that income tax forms 
unjustifiably filed years late, where the IRS has already prepared substitute returns and assessed taxes, do not 
constitute ‘returns’ for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i).”); In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th 
Cir. 1999).  
 52 See, e.g., In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034 (explaining the further circuit split). 
 53 See Vince Bethel, The IRS Assessment and Demand Process, HOUS. CHRON., http://smallbusiness. 
chron.com/irs-assessment-demand-process-22721.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(a) (2012). 
 57 Filing Past Due Tax Returns, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
Employed/Filing-Past-Due-Tax-Returns (last updated June 9, 2016). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Bethel, supra note 53. 
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confirmation of the individual’s liability, the IRS will continue to seek 
payment on the original tax liability and any penalties that may have accrued.61 
While the Beard test contains four elements, the fourth element, which 
states that a tax form must represent an honest and reasonable attempt to 
satisfy the requirements of the tax law,62 is the element that has led to the most 
disagreement among courts.63 This disagreement stems from each court’s effort 
to determine what constitutes an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the 
requirements of the tax law. 
B. The Minority View of the Post-Assessment Issue 
Prior to the BAPCPA amendments, post-assessment tax forms were 
evaluated based on the court’s analysis of the debtor’s compliance with the 
fourth element of the Beard test.64 This methodology led some courts to 
conclude that late-filed post-assessment tax forms are returns (and thus 
dischargeable) if they meet both the Beard test and applicable Code 
requirements,65 because “[t]o be a return, a form is required to ‘evince’ an 
honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the laws [and] [t]his does not require 
inquiry into the circumstances under which a document was filed.”66 Under this 
view, courts examined whether the filer included the necessary information in 
his tax forms, as opposed to the time or manner in which the forms were 
filed.67 
 
 61 Filing Past Due Tax Returns, supra note 57. 
 62 See 26 U.S.C. § 6011(a) (2012) (“When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person 
made liable for any tax imposed by this title, or with respect to the collection thereof, shall make a return or 
statement according to the forms and regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Every person required to make a 
return or statement shall include therein the information required by such forms or regulations.”). 
 63 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 518 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). 
 64 See, e.g., In re Klein, 312 B.R. 443, 447 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“The question considered by the Bankruptcy 
Court here relates to the [h]onest and [r]easonable [a]ttempt prong of the Beard test. The narrow issue is 
whether Appellee’s 1990 and 1991 1040 Forms, filed after the IRS prepared SFRs and assessed taxes (‘post-
assessment’), constitute an honest and reasonable attempt by Appellee to satisfy the requirements of the tax 
law.”); In re Ralph, 266 B.R. 217, 220 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“The dispute in this case revolves around whether the 
Forms 1040EZ filed by Debtor Donna Ralph in 1995 constitute an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the 
law.”). 
 65 See supra text accompanying notes 36–39. 
 66 In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 67 See In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (citing In re Colsen, 446 F.3d at 840; and 
then citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
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Courts opposing the one-day-late rule have consistently cited language 
from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen) 
and Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in In re Payne to support the idea that 
Congress never intended to restrict what constitutes a return based on a strict 
time-based deadline.68 In re Payne involved an individual’s failure to file a tax 
return between 1986 and 1992.69 In 1990, the IRS assessed Payne’s liability for 
his 1986 income. Payne finally filed his 1986 return in 1992 and later sought to 
have his 1986 debt discharged through a 1997 bankruptcy filing.70 While the 
majority in In re Payne held that the debtor’s late-filed form did not comply 
with the Beard test, Judge Easterbrook used his dissent to show why a late-
filed form should still be considered a return.71 
Judge Easterbrook’s concern with the majority’s opinion in In re Payne 
centered around the majority’s view that a document “filed after the authorities 
have borne [the] burden [of calculating the amount due] does not serve the 
purpose of the filing requirement.”72 As Judge Easterbrook noted, the IRS does 
not agree with the majority’s view: “Any taxpayer who wants to propose a 
compromise of his tax liabilities must file a return, even if the Service already 
has gone to the trouble of calculating and assessing the tax without his help.”73 
The Treasury Department, therefore, must believe that a late-filed post-
assessment filing has some use, or the department would not have gone 
through the trouble to include this requirement within the Treasury 
Regulations.74 Judge Easterbrook explained that a form filed post-assessment 
can still be useful because it provides concrete facts regarding the filer’s tax 
information, and these facts can then replace the estimates that the IRS must 
rely on when filing a § 6020(b) substitute return on behalf of an individual who 
filed no return at all.75  
While Judge Easterbrook primarily attacked the courts that support the 
notion that a tax form filed after an IRS assessment is useless and therefore not 
a return, he also correctly predicted that courts would likely interpret BAPCPA 
 
 68 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 520; In re Briggs, 511 B.R. 707, 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014). 
 69 431 F.3d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. at 1060–61 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 72 Id. at 1057 (majority opinion).  
 73 Id. at 1060 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing 26 C.F.R § 301.7122-1(d)). 
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. 
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to preclude discharging any debt resulting from a late-filed tax form.76 Despite 
Judge Easterbrook’s correct prediction, his explanation of why a post-
assessment tax form is still useful lends support to the idea that a tax form filed 
after April 15th should be considered a return, because the form remains useful 
to the IRS regardless of the date on which the form was filed.77 
In re Colsen, a 2006 Eighth Circuit decision, was the last circuit court 
decision that relied on the pre-BAPCPA language to form its opinion.78 In re 
Colsen involved an individual who failed to file his income tax returns from 
1992 through 1996.79 The IRS assessed his liability in 1999, and Mr. Colsen 
filed his returns a few months after the assessment. Mr. Colsen eventually filed 
a bankruptcy petition in 2003 and sought to have his debt resulting from these 
late-filed forms discharged.80  
The Eighth Circuit concluded that timely filing is not relevant when 
determining if a document is a return81 and relied heavily on Judge 
Easterbrook’s dissent from In re Payne.82 Specifically, the court based its 
holding on Judge Easterbrook’s two suggestions that (1) timely filing and 
satisfaction of one’s financial obligations are requirements distinct from the 
definition of a “return,” and (2) “the relevant legal provisions were the ones 
that required the taxpayers yield all financial information necessary for 
calculation of their tax liabilities.”83 The relevant legal provision prior to 
BAPCPA was the Beard test, and the court determined that “it had been 
offered no persuasive reason to create a more subjective definition of ‘return’ 
that is dependent on the facts and circumstances of a taxpayer’s filing.”84 Judge 
Easterbrook’s notion that courts should focus on the content of the tax forms 
led the Eighth Circuit to hold that the fourth factor of the Beard test, which 
 
 76 See id. at 1060–61. 
 77 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (“Judge Easterbrook noted that ‘timely 
filing and satisfaction of one’s financial obligations are requirements distinct from the definition of a “return”’ 
and he argued that the relevant legal provisions were the ones that require taxpayers yield all financial 
information necessary for calculation of their tax liabilities.”) (quoting In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1061) 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
 78 446 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2006) (“But we do not apply that [BAPCPA] language here because Mr. 
Colsen’s bankruptcy petition was filed before the Act’s effective date.”).  
 79 See id. at 838. 
 80 See id. 
 81 Id. at 840. 
 82 See id. (citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060–63 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
 83 Id. (citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060–61 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
 84 Id. 
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requires that a filer’s tax forms must represent an honest and reasonable 
attempt to comply with tax law, should be evaluated based on whether the 
individual filer’s tax forms provide accurate and necessary information, 
regardless of the time that the individual filed his forms.85 
Additionally, the court in In re Colsen rejected the argument that a late-
filed form can never be useful to the IRS.86 The reason that a post-assessment, 
late-filed form is useful is because the form still helps the IRS accurately 
calculate the filer’s liability.87 If an individual never files a tax form, the IRS 
must calculate that individual’s liability without having access to that 
individual’s complete financial records. Even though the late-filed form in In 
re Colsen did not allow the IRS to collect more taxes, the IRS still had a role in 
determining the debtor’s liability following the late-filed forms because the 
court considered “the accurate calculation of a taxpayer’s obligations . . . to be 
a valid purpose that satisfies the tax laws.”88 
C. The Majority View of the Post-Assessment Issue 
Conversely, the majority of courts reached the conclusion that, absent 
extreme extenuating circumstances, late-filed tax forms are not returns once 
the IRS has assessed a penalty because a late-filed return serves no purpose 
once the IRS has assessed a debtor’s liability.89 The result of the majority view 
is that an individual who misses the April 15th filing date and fails to file tax 
forms before the IRS assesses a penalty against that individual is barred from 
receiving a discharge of the tax debt related to the late-filed forms. Courts 
following this view focused primarily on the debtor’s act of filing late, as 
opposed to the content of the tax forms, and made a blanket determination that 
an assessment is essentially the last time that the IRS has any use for an 
individual’s tax forms.90 
The Fourth,91 Sixth,92 Seventh,93 and Ninth Circuits94 issued opinions 
following this majority view. These circuits held that the fourth prong of the 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 841. 
 89 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058; In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 904 (4th Cir. 2003); In re 
Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 90 In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058; In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 904; In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034. 
 91 In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 904. 
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Beard test turns on the subjective intent of the debtor in attempting to comply 
with the tax laws, as opposed to the usefulness of the late-filed document.95 
Under the majority view, a tax form filed after the IRS performed an 
assessment is not dischargeable because “forms filed after an involuntary 
assessment do not serve the purposes of the tax system.”96 
The majority view originated in United States v. Hindenlang (In re 
Hindenlang), a 1999 Sixth Circuit decision where the court presented the view 
that the fourth factor of the Beard test creates a strong presumption that tax 
forms filed after an IRS assessment are not returns.97 In re Hindenlang 
involved an individual who failed to file his income tax returns for the years 
1985 through 1988.98 The IRS prepared substitute returns in 1990 and received 
no response from Mr. Hindenlang.99 Finally, the IRS assessed Mr. Hindelang’s 
liability in 1991. Mr. Hindenlang filed his missing returns in 1993 and later 
filed a bankruptcy petition in 1996.100 Mr. Hindenlang sought to have his debt 
resulting from the 1985 through 1988 tax years discharged.101 
The Sixth Circuit evaluated the fourth prong of the Beard test and found 
that “[i]f a document purporting to be a tax return serves no purpose at all 
under the Internal Revenue Code, such a document cannot, as a matter of law, 
qualify as an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the 
tax law.”102 This opinion is interesting, however, in that the court first raised a 
hypothetical situation where a debtor’s post-assessment filing could possibly 
comply with the Beard test, before declaring that it would “save resolution of 
that hypothetical case for another day.”103 The court’s hypothetical involved a 
situation where a debtor’s form filed post-assessment actually showed an 
increase in the debtor’s liability when compared to the IRS’s assessment 
 
 92 In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034. 
 93 In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058. 
 94 United States v. Hatton (In re Hatton), 220 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 95 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1057; In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 906; In re Hatton, 220 F.3d at 1061; In 
re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1029. 
 96 In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 905; see In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1057; In re Hatton, 220 F.3d at 1061; In 
re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1035. 
 97 In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1035. 
 98 See id. at 1031. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. at 1035.  
 103 Id. at 1035 n.7. 
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estimates.104 While the court did not fully evaluate the scenario, the debt in this 
hypothetical seems to be dischargeable under the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation 
because the taxpayer made an honest and reasonable attempt to comply with 
the law regarding the additional liability.105 “[W]hether [the debtor’s] eventual 
effort had some effect on his tax liability,” therefore, is irrelevant in cases 
where the debtor fails to file a return until after the IRS has assessed that 
individual’s liability because tax forms were only considered to be a return if 
the debtor “made an honest and reasonable effort to comply with the tax 
laws.”106  
While the Fourth and Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Moroney v. IRS (In re 
Moroney) and United States v. Hatton (In re Hatton) did preclude the 
possibility of discharging a tax debt in most cases involving post-assessment 
tax forms, both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits followed In re Hindenlang and 
left open the possibility that a post-assessment filing could qualify as a return 
for dischargeability purposes under extenuating circumstances.107 What, if any, 
extenuating circumstances would allow for this possibility was never fully 
analyzed prior to the passage of BAPCPA. 
II. THE ONE-DAY-LATE RULE: AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT CIRCUIT COURT 
DECISIONS FOLLOWING BAPCPA 
Following the 2005 BAPCPA amendments, a split developed among the 
circuit courts as to the proper interpretation of the hanging paragraph. While 
the Fifth, Tenth, and First Circuits held that a tax form filed after April 15th 
cannot qualify as a return for dischargeability purposes, the Ninth Circuit 
recently held that the pre-BAPCPA Beard test was still the correct method for 
determining whether a late-filed tax form qualifies as a return.108  
 
 104 See id. at 1034 n.5. 
 105 Id. 
 106 In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 107 See id. at 907 (“Circumstances not presented in this case might demonstrate that the debtor, despite his 
delinquency, had attempted in good faith to comply with the laws.”); In re Hatton, 220 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 108 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(finding it was not necessary to resolve whether a post-assessment Form 1040 could be an honest and 
reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law for purposes of the Beard test because under 
§ 523(a) a “return” had to comply with applicable filing requirements); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 932 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (“[A] state income tax return that is filed late under the applicable nonbankruptcy state law is not a 
‘return’ for bankruptcy discharge purposes under § 523(a).”). But see In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (determining that “Hatton applies to the bankruptcy code as amended, and that [the debtor’s] tax 
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While Congress intended for the BAPCPA amendments to clarify certain 
inconsistencies in the Code, courts have split on the proper interpretation of the 
hanging paragraph, and the assessment issue has not been fully resolved.109 The 
First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits follow the one-day-late rule, holding that filing 
deadlines are part of the “applicable filing requirements” that Congress 
mentions in the hanging paragraph.110 Proponents of the one-day-late rule, 
which the Fifth Circuit first discussed in In re McCoy, maintain that a tax form 
filed even one day late is not a return, and any debt arising from a late form is 
not dischargeable in bankruptcy.111 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit,112 
bankruptcy courts,113 the IRS,114 and dicta by the Eighth Circuit115 have rejected 
the one-day-late rule and presented alternative interpretations of the hanging 
paragraph. 
A. In re McCoy: The First Appearance of the One-Day-Late Interpretation 
In In re McCoy, the Fifth Circuit held that late-filed tax forms are not 
returns unless the form was filed with the assistance of the IRS under 
 
filing, made seven years late and three years after the IRS assessed a deficiency against him, was not an 
‘honest and reasonable’ attempt to comply with the tax code”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) 
(No. 16-497). 
 109 Compare In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (“[A] state income tax return that is filed late under the 
applicable nonbankruptcy state law is not a ‘return’ for bankruptcy discharge purposes under § 523(a).”), with 
In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097 (determining that “Hatton applies to the bankruptcy code as amended, and that 
[the debtor’s] tax filing, made seven years late and three years after the IRS assessed a deficiency against him, 
was not an ‘honest and reasonable’ attempt to comply with the tax code”). See generally Stephen J. Csontos, 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Impact on Federal Taxes, 54 U.S. 
ATTY’S BULL., no. 4, July 2006, at 16. 
 110 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 10; In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1325; In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932. 
 111 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (holding that the debtor’s failure to file in the time required under 
Mississippi’s tax law was a failure to satisfy the applicable nonbankruptcy law § 523(a), meaning the debtor’s 
late-filed returns could not be considered tax returns for bankruptcy discharge purposes under the plain 
language of the statute). 
 112 See In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1096. 
 113 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); In re McBride, 534 B.R. 326, 336 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 2015); Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 
479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013). 
 114 See I.R.S. Notice CC-2010-016 (Sept. 2, 2010) (stating that a late-filed tax debt can be discharged); 
I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advice No. 201044008 (Nov. 5, 2010).  
 115 In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006). Although the court did not rely directly on the 
BAPCPA language because the debtor filed his petition prior to the act’s effective date, the Court agreed with 
Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in In re Payne and stated, “[w]e have been offered no persuasive reason to create a 
more subjective definition of “return” that is dependent on the facts and circumstances of a taxpayer’s filing.” 
Id. 
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§ 6020(a).116 In re McCoy involved a debtor, who was granted a chapter 7 
discharge in early 2008, suing the Mississippi State Tax Commission. This 
debtor sought to have the court declare that the debtor’s pre-petition debt 
arising from late-filed state tax forms was discharged when her chapter 7 
discharge was granted.117 The court interpreted the hanging paragraph to mean 
that the Mississippi Tax Code is an “applicable filing requirement” for 
determining the dischargeability of a tax debt.118 The practical result is that 
April 15th, which is mentioned in the Mississippi Tax Code, is the deadline by 
which a tax return must be filed. Thus, the one-day-late rule stems from the 
Fifth Circuit’s understanding that Congress clearly and unambiguously 
intended for the phrase “applicable non-bankruptcy law (including applicable 
filing requirements)” in the hanging paragraph to include the date on which a 
tax form is filed. 
While the consequence of In re McCoy is that debt resulting from a late-
filed tax form is basically nondischargeable, the court maintained that the one-
day-late rule is consistent “with the [Beard] test’s emphasis ‘that where a 
fiduciary, in good faith, makes what it deems the appropriate return, which 
discloses all of the data from which the tax . . . can be computed,’ a proper 
return has been filed.”119 The Fifth Circuit did not clarify, however, how the 
one-day-late rule can be consistent with the Beard test when a tax form filed in 
a jurisdiction following the Beard test is valid in situations where the debtor 
filed the form in good faith and provided all the information necessary to 
assess the tax.120 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit claimed that the House Report 
discussing BAPCPA, which mentioned a desire to close loopholes in the Code, 
provided support for the one-day-late interpretation.121 The legislative history, 
however, does not appear to support the Fifth Circuit’s position, and the one-
day-late rule actually creates a new loophole in the Code.122 
 
 116 See In re McCoy, 666 F.at 932. 
 117 See id. at 925. 
 118 Id. at 928 (discussing MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-41, which states that taxes should be filed either by 
April 15th or the 15th day of the fourth month of the year). 
 119 Id. at 931 (citing In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1033 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted)). 
 120 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012). 
 121 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931 (“BAPCPA was passed, in part, to address the problem of the 
‘bankruptcy system hav[ing] loopholes and incentives that allow–and–sometimes even encourage 
opportunistic personal filings and abuse.’”). 
 122 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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B. IRS Opposition to the One-Day-Late Rule and the Tenth Circuit’s 
Response 
In 2010, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel released a Notice that addressed 
the topic of dischargeability that stated: “A form 1040 is not disqualified as a 
‘return’ under section 523(a) solely because it was filed late.”123 The IRS 
reasoned that a debt does not actually arise until an individual has failed to file 
a return, and the IRS has filed an assessment.124 This simple-to-apply 
viewpoint would allow for the discharge of debt resulting from late-filed tax 
forms in cases where a debtor filed his or her own tax forms prior to the IRS 
assessing the debtor’s liability. The IRS contended that Congress did not 
intend for its definition of “return” to include a strict temporal element.125 
After the Fifth Circuit established the one-day-late rule in In re McCoy, the 
Tenth Circuit’s 2014 In re Mallo decision directly addressed the IRS’s 
position.126 In In re Mallo, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the IRS’s position and 
maintained that the assessment process is irrelevant for determining whether a 
debt arising from a late-filed return is dischargeable because, “if Congress 
wished to make the process relevant to discharge of tax debts, it could have 
easily done so.”127 Although courts are bound by statutory language and the 
role of a judge is not to legislate, the Tenth Circuit’s entire interpretation is 
built on reading into § 523(a) a temporal element that Congress never 
discussed in its amendments.128 Numerous bankruptcy courts have properly 
rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the hanging paragraph, and this 
disagreement will be discussed further in the analysis below.129 
C. Judge Thompson’s In re Fahey Dissent 
The next major discussion regarding the hanging paragraph appeared in the 
First Circuit’s 2015 decision, Fahey v. Massachusetts Department of Revenue 
(In re Fahey).130 While the majority in In re Fahey did little more than agree 
 
 123 I.R.S. Notice, supra note 114.  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126  774 F.3d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 127 Id. 
 128 See id. at 1321–22. 
 129 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 521 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (“Congress could have easily excluded a 
late return, but it did not do so. In fact, there is no temporal element in the definition.”). 
 130 779 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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with the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, Judge Thompson’s dissent addressed issues 
regarding the one-day-late rule that may alter the course of future discussions 
on this topic.131 In re Fahey involved a debt resulting from a state tax, and the 
First Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in In re McCoy, held that a tax document 
filed after April 15th cannot be a valid tax return.132 The majority found that:  
[I]t is more plausible that Congress intended to settle the dispute over 
late-filed tax returns against the debtor (who both fails to pay taxes 
and fails to file a return as required by law) than it is that Congress 
sought to settle some version of the unsettled four-pronged Beard 
test.133  
The First Circuit therefore agreed with the Fifth Circuit and held that a tax 
form filed one day late can never qualify as a return unless it was filed with the 
assistance of the IRS under § 6020(a).  
Judge Thompson dissented, detailing his issues with both the harsh effect 
that the one-day-late interpretation has on debtors, and the fact that the 
majority ignored the surrounding language of the statute to reach its 
conclusion. Judge Thompson maintained that the one-day-late rule leads to an 
absurd result because the rule punishes many law-abiding, honest individuals 
regardless of the individual’s reason for filing late.134 Judge Thompson thought 
that filing a tax form late should not automatically make debt stemming from 
that form non-dischargeable because, “[i]f the statute’s language is plain, the 
sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms. In so 
doing, however, we only apply plain meaning if the statutory language is not 
ambiguous and would not ‘lead to absurd results.’”135  
Under the First Circuit’s one-day-late analysis, he argued, the disposition 
required by the text would be absurd because individuals who are attempting to 
provide the IRS with relevant, valuable information regarding tax liability are 
being punished regardless of the reason for the late filing.136 While the majority 
 
 131 See id. at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 132 See id. at 10. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id. at 11 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s holding] simultaneously takes too academic 
and literal of an approach to its reading of one of the code’s definitional provisions, leading to a result that 
defies common sense, while also conveniently ignoring the plain meaning of other words in the very same 
paragraph, in order to reach a certain outcome.”). 
 135 Id. (quoting Morse v. Rudler (In re Rudler), 576 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 136 Id. at 19. 
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claimed to rely on the “plain meaning” of the statute, Judge Thompson pointed 
out that in enforcing statutes according to their plain meaning, “we only apply 
plain meaning if the statutory language is not ambiguous and would not lead to 
absurd results.”137 
In addition to the absurdity of punishing every individual who files a tax 
form one day late regardless of the reason for filing late, Judge Thompson 
explained that the majority’s interpretation requiring complete, perfect 
compliance with all the applicable filing requirements will only lead to more 
illogical results in situations—situations where it is unlikely Congress intended 
to preclude the possibility of a discharge.138 These illogical results are 
impossible to avoid under the strict one-day-late interpretation because any 
individual who has failed to comply with every specific filing requirement will 
be barred from the possibility of receiving a discharge on a tax debt. 
Additionally, Judge Thompson questioned why Congress would choose not 
to alter the language of § 523(a)(B)(ii),139 which allows for the discharge of 
late-filed taxes as long as those returns were not filed within two years prior to 
the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, if Congress intended to eliminate the 
possibility of discharging debt stemming from a late-filed return. “As the 
debtors appropriately urge, there would be no point in leaving Subsection (ii) 
the specific exception that deals with late filers–if Congress meant for the 
hanging paragraph to penalize everyone who misses filing deadlines.”140 As a 
result, Judge Thompson reasoned, it is not possible to accurately ascertain the 
plain meaning of one specific phrase within a subsection of a statute without 
looking at the surrounding sections of the statute.141 Therefore, the majority’s 
interpretation must be incorrect because the majority entirely ignored 
§ 523(a)(B)(ii) when it determined that Congress intended for the phrase 
“includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a),”142 which appears in 
 
 137 Id.  
 138 See id. at 11 n.16 (identifying that seemingly irrelevant issues, such as failing to properly staple 
documents, would ultimately have to preclude the possibility of a discharge because the document did not 
comply with the applicable filing requirements).  
 139 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(B)(ii) (2012) (“A discharge under § 727 . . . does not discharge an individual from 
any debt – for a tax or a customs duty . . . with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or notice, if 
required . . . was filed or given after the date on which such return, report, or notice was last due, under 
applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition . . . .”). 
 140 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 141 Id. at 13–14. 
 142 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). 
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the hanging paragraph, to be an exhaustive list of all the types of late-filed 
documents that may be considered returns for the purpose of discharge.143 
Judge Thompson explained that even by solely looking at the plain meaning, 
the logical interpretation of the word “includes” would not create an exhaustive 
list.144 
Finally, the majority’s interpretation rewards individuals who intentionally 
fail to file returns, are caught by the IRS, and agree to file forms with 
assistance of the IRS under § 6020(a).145 While these individuals are still 
eligible for a discharge of this debt, a debtor who unintentionally missed the 
filing deadline and filed his own taxes one day late will never be able to 
receive a discharge.146 As a result, the majority’s interpretation appears to 
create a system that leaves open a loophole for individuals to exploit the 
bankruptcy discharge system. Judge Thompson’s dissent succinctly raises the 
flaws in the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations of the hanging 
paragraph, and his arguments will be further analyzed below. 
D. The Ninth Circuit Declines to Adopt the One-Day-Late Rule 
Unlike the circuits following the one-day-late rule, the Ninth Circuit, in IRS 
v. Smith (In re Smith), affirmed a district court’s decision to apply the Beard 
test as opposed to the one-day-late rule.147 Although the Ninth Circuit did not 
directly address the one-day-late late rule, the decision to continue using the 
Beard test as it had been applied prior to 2005 necessarily implies that the one-
day-late rule cannot be the correct interpretation of the BAPCPA amendments. 
As a result, a split now exists among the circuit courts following the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding. 
In In re Smith, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
originally held that a late-filed form could be a return as long as the statutory 
requirements are satisfied, and the court has made a determination that the filer 
satisfied the Beard test.148 The court reached this conclusion after finding that 
 
 143 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 144 Id. at 14 (“If Congress intended the outcome espoused by the majority, it would have used different 
language (e.g., ‘is limited to’)—not the word includes.”).  
 145 Id. at 18. 
 146 Id. at 13. 
 147 828 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 148 Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), 527 B.R. 14, 23 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 828 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2016), 
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) (No. 16-497). 
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the Beard test requires courts to analyze all of the facts surrounding the late 
filing when determining whether a late-filed form qualifies as a return.149 As a 
result, the In re Smith decision mirrors the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel’s holding in Martin II, which is discussed in the following section. In 
affirming the district court’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit undertook a subjective 
investigation of the facts surrounding the debtor’s late filing and held that the 
debtor’s tax forms were not a return because they were filed years after the IRS 
had already assessed the debtor’s taxes.150 Notably, the court also chose not to 
answer whether a tax return filed after an IRS assessment can ever be a return; 
thus, the post-assessment dispute has not been resolved.151  
III. BANKRUPTCY COURTS OPPOSING THE ONE-DAY-LATE RULE 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in In re Smith, bankruptcy 
courts declining to follow the one-day-late rule have provided alternative 
interpretations of § 523(a) that appear to create an effective system that 
balances Congress’s interest in passing the BAPCPA amendments with the 
general interests of American bankruptcy law. While the First, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits all reached the same conclusion—that debt resulting from a late-filed 
tax form is never dischargeable—numerous bankruptcy courts, academic 
papers, the Ninth Circuit, and the IRS152 have expressed their displeasure with 
the one-day-late interpretation of the hanging paragraph. These bankruptcy 
courts and the IRS maintain that a debt resulting from a late-filed return is 
dischargeable if the debtor satisfies the various pre-BAPCPA requirements for 
a discharge.153 
Although the post-assessment issue was not relevant in In re Maitland 
because the IRS had not yet assessed a penalty against the debtor at the time 
when the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition, numerous courts declining to 
 
 149 See infra Section III.A. 
 150 See In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097. 
 151 See id. (“We need not decide the close question of whether any post-assessment filing could be ‘honest 
and reasonable’ because these are not close facts; the IRS communicated with Smith for years before assessing 
a deficiency, and Smith waited several more years before responding to the IRS or reporting his 2001 financial 
information.”). 
 152 See supra Section II.B; see also In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097. 
 153 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 726 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (“The Court concludes that § 523(a)(*)’s requirement that a return satisfy ‘applicable 
bankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements)’ does not include a timeliness requirement and, 
therefore, does not exclude the Debtor’s late-filed post-assessment returns.”). 
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follow the In re McCoy logic have held that an IRS assessment does not 
inherently preclude a discharge as long as the debtor has satisfied all of the 
Beard and statutory requirements.154  
Although all courts declining to follow the one-day-late rule maintain that a 
late-filed tax return can be valid as long as the Beard test is satisfied, a split 
does exist among the courts that oppose the one-day-late rule. While some 
courts maintain that the fourth prong of the Beard test involves only looking at 
whether an individual has filed a tax form that is of use to the IRS,155 other 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that the fourth prong of the 
Beard test involves looking at all relevant factors, including when the form 
was filed, why it was filed late, and whether it was useful to the IRS.156 
Courts opposing the one-day-late rule are largely concerned with three 
major issues: (1) the harsh result of the one-day-late interpretation; (2) the 
inconsistency between the one-day-late interpretation and the surrounding 
language of § 523; and (3) a lack of legislative history supporting the notion 
that Congress intended to displace the Beard test.157 The center of the argument 
opposing the one-day-late rule is that the Fifth Circuit’s “draconian 
interpretation” of the hanging paragraph “is inconsistent with the oft-stated 
policy of the Code that its principal purpose is to grant a fresh start to the 
‘honest, but unfortunate debtor.’”158 Given that a majority of courts allowed for 
the dischargeability of debts arising from late-filed tax forms prior to 
BAPCPA, courts opposing the one-day-late rule have used this policy 
argument, coupled with a lack of legislative history supporting the one-day-late 
rule, as a basis for the idea that Congress did not intend to exclude late-filed 
tax forms from being returns.159 
 
 154 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 480, 492 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); In re Briggs, 511 B.R. 707, 718 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 2014); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. at 370. 
 155 See In re Davis, No. 14-26507 (CMG), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3331, at *14 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 29, 
2015). 
 156 See Martin II, 542 B.R. at 492; In re Smith, 527 B.R. 14, 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 828 F.3d 1094 
(9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) (No. 16-497). 
 157 See, e.g., Martin II, 542 B.R. at 479–80, 489–90; In re Davis, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3331, at *13. 
 158 In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 521; see also Martin I, 508 B.R. at 726–27; In re Briggs, 511 B.R. at 714–
16. 
 159 See Brown v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Brown), 489 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. In re Gonzalez, 506 B.R. 317 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2015), and aff’d, No. ADV 11-04150-MSH, 2014 WL 1815393 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Apr. 3, 2014), and rev’d sub 
nom. In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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The one-day-late rule is grounded in the idea that, because “the applicable 
filing requirements include filing deadlines, § 523(a)(*) plainly excludes late-
filed Form 1040s from the definition of a return.”160 While the In re McCoy 
plain-language interpretation is an easy-to-apply rule, courts opposing the one-
day-late rule worry that “the one-day-late interpretation of the hanging 
paragraph yields a potentially absurd result.”161 As a result, recent bankruptcy 
court decisions have adopted and expanded on Judge Thompson’s dissent in In 
re Fahey.162 Bankruptcy courts opposing the one-day-late rule explain that 
relevant nonbankruptcy law does not support the notion that a tax form filed 
after the deadline can never qualify as a return. As the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of California found in United States v. Martin (In re 
Martin) (“Martin I”), provisions of the Internal Revenue Code support this 
proposition: 
The only temporal consideration that this court could locate in the tax 
law is the April 15 filing deadline under IRC § 6072(a). However, 
unlike other requirements imposed by applicable tax law, a 
taxpayer’s failure to timely file a return by this statutory deadline 
does not defeat the purpose of the return or render it a nullity; the late 
filing is simply grounds to impose additional penalties and interest on 
the taxpayer. A return filed on April 16 is still accepted as a return by 
the IRS.163 
If courts look to the Beard test when interpreting the applicable nonbankruptcy 
law discussed in § 523(a), courts opposing the one-day-late rule suggest that 
the policy behind bankruptcy could be satisfied, and the harsh result of the 
one-day-late rule could be avoided.164 
 
 160 In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 161 Martin I, 508 B.R. at 729. 
 162 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 519–20 (“[Judge Thompson] criticized the [In re Fahey] majority for 
being ‘unfairly dismissive of the debtor’s logical interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue.’ This court 
agrees that the majority’s result in Fahey ‘defies common sense.’”) (quoting In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 11 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (Thompson, J., dissenting)). 
 163 Martin I, 508 B.R. at 732 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 164 See, e.g., Pendergast v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Pendergast), 494 B.R. 8, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 510 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 14-9004, 
2015 WL 3388354 (1st Cir. May 1, 2015) (noting the “unsavory” result of this interpretation). 
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A. The Split: Is a Court Determination Always Required to Determine If a 
Late-Filed Form Is a Return? 
Recently, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit vacated the 
Martin I decision on the grounds that it was too narrow, concluding that the 
more expansive pre-BAPCPA minority approach for the Beard test165 must be 
applied when evaluating if a late-filed tax form is a return.166 While the 
Bankruptcy Court in Martin I originally held that a late-filed tax form is a 
return whenever the form is objectively useful to the IRS, the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel vacated this ruling in Martin II and held that the fourth 
element of the Beard test must involve an actual determination by the court as 
to whether an individual has made an honest and reasonable attempt to comply 
with the tax law.167 
Although the court in both Martin I and Martin II maintained that a late-
filed tax form can qualify as a return, the Martin II court argued that courts 
must always evaluate all relevant factors, including the “number of missing 
returns, the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and any other 
circumstances reasonably pertaining to the honesty and reasonableness of the 
[debtors’] efforts.”168 Thus, an individual’s failure to file his or her tax forms 
until after an IRS assessment does not preclude a discharge when the court 
finds that the individual actually filed his or her own tax form and has 
complied with the Beard test. The Martin II holding stands for the idea that the 
fourth prong of the Beard test requires a determination by the court based on 
all the relevant facts whenever the test is applied.169 Therefore, the Martin II 
holding mirrors the recent Ninth Circuit opinion on the issue, In re Smith.170  
 
 165 See In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he honesty and genuineness of the filer’s 
attempt to satisfy the tax law should be determined from the face of the form itself, not from the filer’s 
delinquency or the reasons for it.”).  
 166 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 492 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).  
 167 See id. at 491.  
 168 Id. 
 169 See id. (“[W]e furthermore believe that the determination of whether all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances constitute an honest and reasonable effort to comply with the applicable tax laws is best made, 
in the first instance, by the bankruptcy court.”). 
 170 Compare In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Here, Smith failed to make a tax filing 
until seven years after his return was due and three years after the IRS went to the trouble of calculating a 
deficiency and issuing an assessment. Under these circumstances, Smith’s ‘belated acceptance of 
responsibility’ was not a reasonable attempt to comply with the tax code.”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 
13, 2016) (No. 16-497), with Martin II, 542 B.R. at 491 (“[W]e furthermore believe that the determination of 
whether all of the relevant facts and circumstances constitute an honest and reasonable effort to comply with 
the applicable tax laws is best made, in the first instance, by the bankruptcy court.”). 
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Importantly, both the court in Martin I and the court in Martin II support 
the notion that Congress did not intend for the hanging paragraph to impose a 
strict temporal deadline in the definition of “return.” Additionally, the Ninth 
Circuit’s finding that the Martin II reasoning was correct has led to further 
confusion as to what exactly Congress intended with the BAPCPA 
amendments. Ultimately, this issue needs to be resolved to determine whether 
the Martin I interpretation, the Martin II/In re Smith interpretation, the one-
day-late rule, or some alternate interpretation of the hanging paragraph is the 
correct interpretation that Congress intended when it passed the BAPCPA 
amendments. 
B. The Future of the Discussion Regarding the One-Day-Late Rule 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Smith created a split among the circuit 
courts that has yet to be resolved. While the Fifth Circuit’s logic supporting the 
one-day-late rule was popular among courts immediately following the passage 
of the BAPCPA amendments, recent court opinions appear to be shifting away 
from the hardline rule in favor of the more flexible Beard test.171 This shift is 
sensible, given the fact the one-day-late interpretation does not fully account 
for the problems that Congress sought to resolve in passing the BAPCPA 
amendments. 
Additionally, courts opposing the one-day-late rule note that the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation in In re McCoy is unfounded when considering not only 
the harsh practical effect of the rule, but also the fact that the one-day-late rule 
is a large departure from the way in which the majority of courts treated late-
filed tax documents prior to the BAPCPA amendments.172 Various courts and 
scholars have raised both plain language and statutory construction 
arguments;173 the remainder of this Comment will analyze the flaws of the one-
day-late interpretation in light of these criticisms. 
 
 171 See, e.g., Justice v. United States (In re Justice), 817 F.3d 738, 743 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Smith, 828 
F.3d at 1096–97.  
 172 Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 726–27 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015) (identifying other courts and the IRS as critics of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation). 
 173 See, e.g., Martin II, 542 B.R. at 492; Morgan D. King, Tolstoy, Discharging Taxes, and the Fifth 
Circuit, 4 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Apr. 2012, Westlaw, 2012 No. 4 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 3.  
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ANALYSIS 
I. PLAIN MEANING ANALYSIS 
The hanging paragraph is ambiguous because the plain language of the 
statute does not provide definitive support for either the one-day-late rule or 
alternative interpretations of the hanging paragraph.174 Courts following the 
one-day-late interpretation ignore this ambiguity while seeking to achieve a 
specific result. While proponents of the one-day-late rule base their view on 
the notion that “the plain language meaning of the [Bankruptcy] Code should 
rarely be trumped,”175 the one-day-late rule approach fails to resolve two major 
issues related to the plain meaning of the statute. First, the hanging paragraph 
requires individuals to comply with “applicable filing requirements,”176 and 
courts following the one-day-late rule fail to explain how the strict one-day-
late rule could apply to trivial filing requirements. Second, the language 
surrounding the hanging paragraph cannot be ignored when interpreting the 
phrase “applicable filing requirements.” 
In conducting its plain language analysis, the Fifth Circuit in In re McCoy 
concluded, “[the debtor’s] failure to file in the time required under 
Mississippi’s tax law is a failure to satisfy the applicable nonbankruptcy law 
referenced in § 523(a).”177 To support this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied 
on the notion that “[although] the Code at times is ‘awkward and even 
ungrammatical . . . that does not make it ambiguous.’”178 This interpretation 
fails to answer either of the aforementioned concerns and leaves two important 
questions unanswered: First, is the phrase “applicable filing requirements” 
more ambiguous than the proponents of the one-day-late interpretation 
suggest? Second, do the proponents of the one-day-late interpretation ignore 
this ambiguity in favor of reaching a desired conclusion? 
In general, courts do not offer their own interpretation of a statute unless 
the language of that statute is vague or ambiguous.179 The one-day-late 
 
 174 See supra text accompanying notes 16–43. 
 175 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting DaimlerChrysler 
Fin. Servs. Ams. LLC v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
 176 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘return’ means a return 
that satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements.”)). 
 177 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 928. 
 178 See id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
 179 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). 
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interpretation, therefore, would be a correct interpretation of the hanging 
paragraph if the language of the hanging paragraph were clear and 
unambiguous. The language of the hanging paragraph, however, is vague, and 
additional tools of interpretation are necessary to properly apply the statute as 
Congress intended. Ultimately, the courts following the one-day-late rule 
“gloss over one of the most important rules of plain meaning statutory 
construction: that the meaning of a statutory term is only considered plain and 
unambiguous if the term is clearly understood in the context of the words 
surrounding it and in the context of the larger statutory scheme.”180 
A. The Phrase “Applicable Filing Requirements” Is Ambiguous 
In the First Circuit case In re Fahey, the court provided an effective 
hypothetical example where the one-day-late rule would be difficult to 
uniformly apply.181 As the First Circuit noted, “Perhaps the term ‘applicable 
filing requirements’ may acquire vagueness at the outer boundaries of its 
possible application.”182 In defining “vagueness,” the First Circuit relied on 
Justice Scalia’s explanation that vagueness exists where a phrase’s 
“unquestionable meaning has uncertain application to various factual 
situations.”183 The First Circuit’s hypothetical involved an improperly stapled 
tax form, which appears to serve as the court’s example for where the term 
“applicable filing requirements” might be vague. Unfortunately, the court 
decided not to deal with this issue and declined to address whether an 
individual failing to properly staple his tax forms would constitute a failure to 
satisfy applicable filing requirements.184 By choosing not to fully analyze this 
issue, the court ignored the complexities involved in interpreting the vagueness 
of the hanging paragraph in favor of adopting the bright line one-day-late 
rule.185 
In In re Mallo, the Tenth Circuit considered the dictionary definitions of 
the individual terms “applicable,” “filing,” and “requirement” before 
 
 180 Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 486 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
 181 779 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2015) (“For example, is an instruction on an official form that the filer not 
staple the return together, or staple the check to the return, an ‘applicable filing requirement’?”).  
 182 Id. 
 183 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 31–32 
(2012). 
 184 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 5. 
 185 Id. (“Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Congress’s chosen test called for satisfying the filing 
requirements of applicable law, not merely making an ‘honest attempt’ to do so.”). 
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concluding that “the plain language of the phrase [‘applicable filing 
requirement’] means something that must be done with respect to filing a tax 
return.”186 This definition is offered by the court to support the idea that a 
debtor’s failure to satisfy any and all applicable nonbankruptcy legal 
requirements related to filing a tax return precludes that debtor’s tax forms 
from being a valid return for dischargeability purposes. The Tenth Circuit’s 
approach does little, if anything, to address situations where it is unclear how 
the court would apply the one-day-late rule, such as when the debtor fails to 
properly staple a tax form. 
The plain language analysis conducted by the First and Tenth Circuits has 
led proponents of the one-day-late rule to prematurely conclude that “any type 
of return not filed in accord with applicable filing requirements is not a ‘return’ 
under our reading of the statute.”187 No circuit court has addressed the 
uncertainty surrounding the phrase “applicable filing requirements” or 
explained how exactly the one-day-late rule would apply in a situation where 
an individual has failed to comply with a trivial filing requirement. If a late-
filed form is not a return because the filer has failed to comply with applicable 
filing requirements, it would seem to follow that an individual who mistakenly 
fills out part of his tax form incorrectly has also not filed a valid return for the 
same reason.188  
Unless Congress desired to create a system requiring perfection when filing 
a tax form, the strict one-day-late interpretation of the phrase “applicable filing 
requirements” is problematic when it is applied to requirements other than the 
date of filing. The hanging paragraph is therefore ambiguous because the one-
day-late interpretation cannot be uniformly applied to situations involving 
other trivial “filing requirements.” Given this ambiguity, courts must consult 
additional tools of statutory interpretation beyond the plain meaning of the 
statute to interpret the hanging paragraph properly. 
 
 186 774 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 187 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 6. 
 188 See Jay Hancock, After 94 Years, Filing Taxes Still a Process of Trivial Tyranny, BALT. SUN (Apr. 15, 
2007), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-04-15/business/0704150161_1_earned-income-credit-qualifying-
child-eic (“There are 77 boxes to complete on [2007]’s Form 1040, each a trap door of potential perjury and 
fraud prosecution.”).  
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B. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Ignores the Language Surrounding the 
Phrase “Applicable Filing Requirements” 
Under the one-day-late interpretation, the only types of late-filed tax forms 
that can ever qualify as “returns” are § 6020(a) forms189 because § 6020(a) 
forms are the only types of acceptable late-filed tax forms that Congress 
explicitly mentions in the hanging paragraph.190 The courts following the one-
day-late rule suggest that Congress intended for § 6020(a) to be a narrow 
exception to the general rule that a late-filed tax form is not a return.191 If, 
however, Congress considered § 6020(a) forms to be valid returns for 
dischargeability purposes, it is unclear why other late-filed forms could not 
also be valid if the individual filing the forms provided the IRS with necessary 
information. 
In contrast, a plain language reading suggests that Congress intended for 
the language regarding § 6020(a) to be one example of a type of late-filed form 
that can still be a “return,” as opposed to the sole example. This point is 
evidenced by the fact that Congress chose to use the term “includes” as 
opposed to a term that would more clearly express that § 6020(a) is the only 
acceptable late-filed return.192 Congress’s decision to use “includes” in the final 
draft of the hanging paragraph, as opposed to a limiting term such as “only” or 
“is limited to,” must be viewed as an intentional decision and cannot be 
ignored. Congress’s choice not to explicitly clarify whether a § 6020(a) form is 
the only example of a late-filed form that can be a return for dischargeability 
purposes is one example of an ambiguity present in the hanging paragraph 
because the plain language of the statute does not provide definitive support 
for either the one-day-late interpretation or an opposing view. 
Further, the specific language regarding § 6020(b) forms193 would be 
irrelevant if the one-day-late interpretation is correct in concluding that 
§ 6020(a) forms are the only acceptable type of late-filed returns. There would 
 
 189 Section 6020(a) forms are late-filed tax forms drafted by the IRS and confirmed by the individual filer. 
26 U.S.C. § 6020(a) (2012). Section 6020(b) forms are late-filed tax forms filed by the IRS on behalf of an 
individual with no confirmation or signature from the individual filer. Id. § 6020(b)(1). 
 190 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012) (“Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a 
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 . . . .”).  
 191 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 928–29 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 192 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (“Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) . . . .”). 
 193 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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be no reason for Congress to specifically discuss § 6020(b) forms because a 
§ 6020(b) form can only be filed after the original filing deadline. 
Interestingly, the majority in In re Fahey admitted that the one-day-late 
interpretation does render the language regarding § 6020(b) superfluous before 
claiming that “[w]hatever one thinks of this redundancy, it offers too little to 
parry the force of the observation that a requirement to file on time is a filing 
requirement.”194 Ignoring this “redundancy” results in an overly simplified 
interpretation that does not fully reflect the language that Congress chose to 
use in the statute. 
Courts following the one-day-late interpretation also have failed to address 
the issue that if a § 6020(a) form is the only type of return that is accepted after 
the filing deadline, then it logically must follow that a § 6020(b) form would 
be the only type of return that would not be accepted.195 This failure to evaluate 
the entire statute constitutes a “fail[ure] to substantively address why the 
absurd conclusion we must draw from [the one-day-late rule] reading of the 
statute does not require consideration of what Congress actually meant when it 
added the § 6020 language to the statute.”196 The debate among courts over the 
meaning of this clause suggests that there is an ambiguity in the statute and 
that courts should consult other relevant tools of interpretation to determine 
what Congress intended to do when it passed the BAPCPA amendments. 
Finally, Congress used the term “return” to describe § 6020(b) forms in the 
hanging paragraph.197 Congress must have therefore considered § 6020(b) 
forms to be returns and likely sought to use the hanging paragraph as a vehicle 
for explaining that debt stemming from these returns is not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. A § 6020(b) return is one in which the IRS prepares the return 
without any assistance from the individual.198 The difference between 
§ 6020(a) and § 6020(b) returns is that an individual agrees to cooperate with 
the IRS and sign the return under the former.199 As many courts have noted, 
Congress likely intended to reward individuals who comply with the IRS and 
 
 194 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931). 
 195 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (“Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a final 
order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 . . . .”); In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7. 
 196 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 15 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 197 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). 
 198 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b) (2012). 
 199 See id. § 6020(a)–(b). 
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punish those who do not.200 The validity of a § 6020(a) or § 6020(b) return 
never hinges on the date that the return is filed because both forms are always 
filed after the filing deadline. Under this alternative interpretation, late-filed 
forms in which the individual provides relevant tax information to the IRS, 
such as § 6020(a) forms, would be valid returns as long as the Beard test and 
any other relevant statutory provisions (i.e., the two-year rule) are satisfied. 
Late-filed forms, in which the individual either provided no information or 
false information, would never be returns for dischargeability purposes.  
This interpretation would also not run afoul of the majority’s worry in In re 
Fahey that “we would be left without any textual basis for distinguishing those 
filing requirements that count from those that do not.”201 Those “applicable 
filing requirements” would include requirements involving situations where an 
individual has not filed a return (like § 6020(b)) or situations where an 
individual has done something to impede the IRS from calculating his taxes 
(like intentionally providing false information on a late-filed 1040 form). 
Further analysis beyond the plain language of the statute is therefore 
necessary because of ambiguities in the language of the hanging paragraph and 
the discrepancies with regards to the surrounding language of the statute. The 
courts following the one-day-late rule rely solely on the plain language of the 
statute and “gloss over one of the most important rules of plain meaning 
statutory construction: that the meaning of a statutory term is only considered 
plain and unambiguous if the term is clearly understood in the context of the 
words surrounding it and in the context of the larger statutory scheme.”202 The 
phrase “applicable filing requirements” in the hanging paragraph is ambiguous 
because it must be considered in the context of the language surrounding the 
phrase. “The clarity of statutory language only can be measured in ‘the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
a whole.’”203 The ambiguities in the statute cause the one-day-late 
interpretation to be an incomplete exercise in statutory interpretation, and it is 
 
 200 See, e.g., In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 201 779 F.3d at 7. 
 202 Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 486 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
 203 Id. (quoting Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))). 
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necessary to evaluate the statute in light of Congress’s intent and the relevant 
canons of statutory interpretation.204 
II. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND FOR BAPCPA TO DISPLACE THE BEARD TEST 
Although courts following the one-day-late rule do not see the rule as a 
departure from pre-BAPCPA practices,205 the practical outcome of this rule has 
altered the dischargeability of tax debt resulting from late-filed forms in a 
major way. The real issues with the one-day-late interpretation are twofold. 
First, Congress never mentioned a desire to replace the Beard test. Second, the 
one-day-late interpretation creates a new loophole in the Code. At its most 
basic, the one-day-late interpretation runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s notion 
that “[p]re-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice is telling because ‘we will not read 
the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear 
indication that Congress intended such a departure.’”206 Additionally, “[the] 
Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code, 
however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect 
a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some 
discussion in the legislative history.”207 
The Fifth Circuit stated in In re McCoy that the one-day-late rule “is 
consonant with the pre-BAPCPA test’s emphasis ‘that where a fiduciary, in 
good faith, makes what it deems the appropriate return, which discloses all of 
the data from which the tax . . . can be computed,’ a proper return has been 
filed.”208 The Fifth Circuit failed to explain, however, how the one-day-late 
rule could possibly operate in harmony with the Beard test when the rule 
explicitly bars individuals who, in good faith, disclose all of the necessary 
information regarding their taxes a day late from receiving a discharge. While 
the one-day-late approach may be similar to the Beard test in that both provide 
 
 204 YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RECENT TRENDS 3 (2008), http://research.policyarchive.org/19279.pdf. 
 205 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931 (“We see no ‘major change’ from pre-BAPCPA practices by 
reading § 523(a)(*) to generally exclude late state tax returns from the definition of return for bankruptcy 
discharge purposes, while differentiating between § 6020(a) and § 6020(b) returns.”). 
 206 Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007)). 
 207 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992). See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Hey the Sun is Hot 
and the Water’s Fine: Why Not Strip Off That Lien, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13 (2013). 
 208 In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931. 
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interpretations of the term “return,” the result of the In re McCoy temporal 
requirement alters the Code in a way that Congress never explicitly intended.209 
A. The BAPCPA Legislative History Contains No Clear Indication That 
Congress Sought to Impose a Strict Temporal Deadline 
Proponents of the one-day-late rule support the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that 
Congress intended for BAPCPA to preclude late-filed tax forms from being 
returns within the meaning of the Code, in part because these individuals claim 
that the BAPCPA legislative history favors this result.210 In contrast, courts and 
academics opposing the one-day-late rule maintain the In re McCoy analysis 
fails to address the lack of any “clear indication” by Congress to dramatically 
alter the pre-BAPCPA Beard test.211 The main issue that courts struggled with 
prior to BAPCPA was determining if a tax form filed after an IRS assessment 
can be a return.212 This assessment issue is likely what Congress desired to 
clarify through its definition of “return.”213 If Congress sought to impose a new 
temporal requirement, it could have explicitly stated this desire in either the 
BAPCPA text or legislative history. As Judge Thompson explains, “[i]n trying 
to discern legislative intent, we look to the historical content of the statute (i.e. 
prior case law), the legislative history of the statutory provision, and the policy 
underlying the statute.”214 
While interpreting the hanging paragraph, courts following the one-day-late 
rule focus on the fact that Congress did not include language in the hanging 
paragraph that specifically allows for a late-filed tax form to be a return.215 
These courts suggest that Congress’s failure to include this specific language 
 
 209 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt.1 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88. 
 210 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 927 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90–92) (“[The House Report explains] that BAPCPA was motivated by four factors: the 
‘recent escalation of consumer bankruptcy filings,’ the ‘significant losses . . . associated with bankruptcy 
filings,’ the fact that the ‘bankruptcy system has loopholes that allow and–sometimes–even encourage 
opportunistic personal filings and abuse,’ and ‘the fact that some bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a 
significant portion of their debts.’”). 
 211 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 485–86 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
 212 See In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
 213 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012). 
 214 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 15 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 215 See In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Congress could have expressly stated a 
document is a return if it ‘satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable 
substantive filing requirements)’ or ‘(including applicable filing requirements, except the date the filing is 
due).’”).  
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somehow implies that Congress intended to displace the pre-BAPCPA 
caselaw. This argument is unsupported by the legislative history and difficult 
to accept because prior to BAPCPA, no circuit court ever held that a tax form 
was not a return solely because it was filed late.216 Congress did not need to 
include explicit language allowing for the dischargeability of this type of debt 
because of the long-standing presumption that Congress, when legislating, is 
aware of both existing caselaw and the tools of statutory interpretation courts 
employ.217 As a result, courts following the one-day-late rule ignore the notion 
that “[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write on a 
clean slate.”218 
B. The BAPCPA Legislative History Does Not Support the Idea that Filing a 
Tax Form Late Constitutes an Act of Wrongdoing 
The BAPCPA legislative history does not support the Fifth Circuit’s one-
day-late interpretation in In re McCoy. The committee report discussing the 
BAPCPA amendments only briefly mentions the hanging paragraph.219 This 
Report states: 
Section 714 of the Act amends section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code to provide that a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, or similar State or local law, constitutes 
filing a return (and the debt can be discharged), but that a return filed 
on behalf of a taxpayer pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code, or similar state or local law, does not constitute filing 
a return (and the debt cannot be discharged).220 
In addressing this legislative history, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
“Congress, when later drafting § 523(a)(*) to differentiate between § 6020(a) 
and § 6020(b) returns, likely wanted to reward taxpayers who cooperated with 
 
 216 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court would not adopt a rule 
that a tax form filed after an assessment can never be a return because “[t]here might . . . be circumstances 
beyond a taxpayer’s control that prevented him from filing a timely return, or even from asking for an 
extension of the time to file, before the tax was assessed”); In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034 (“The 
Bankruptcy Code does permit debtors who have filed late returns to obtain discharges of tax liability in certain 
situations.”). 
 217 See KIM, supra note 204, at 3 (citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991)).  
 218 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 17 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Dewsnupp v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 
(1992)). 
 219 H.R. Rep No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 102–03 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 166–67. 
 220 Id. 
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the IRS.”221 The court supported its conclusion by turning to a 1978 Senate 
Report discussing the passage of § 523(a), which, in relevant part, states: “[I]n 
general, tax claims which are nondischargeable, despite a lack of priority, are 
those to whose staleness the debtor contributed by some wrong-doing or 
serious fault.”222 The Fifth Circuit failed, however, to mention that the only 
example of a nondischargeable tax claim that Congress addressed in the Senate 
Report was a situation where an individual files a fraudulent return.223 
Although filing a tax form late may lead to monetary penalties,224 the act of 
filing a fraudulent return is a serious criminal offense that creates major 
problems for the IRS and the individual who filed the false return.225 While the 
Fifth Circuit is likely correct in suggesting that Congress wanted to reward 
taxpayers who cooperated with the IRS, neither the legislative history nor the 
In re McCoy decision explains how filing a tax form one day late constitutes 
wrongdoing or serious fault on behalf of the individual filing the forms. 
The IRS does not support the notion that such a strict temporal requirement 
should be read into the statute.226 The IRS maintains that the pre-BAPCPA 
majority approach to the post-assessment issue, which precludes a discharge in 
cases where an individual has not filed a return by the time that the IRS 
assesses that individual’s liability, is the correct interpretation of the hanging 
paragraph.227 Further, the IRS does not suggest that filing a return late 
automatically constitutes an act of wrongdoing because they do not even apply 
a penalty on late-filed returns where the filer “can show reasonable cause for 
not filing or paying on time.”228  
Confusingly, the courts following the one-day-late rule suggest that the IRS 
interpretation is wrong because “if Congress wished to make the assessment 
 
 221 In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 
 222 Id. (citation omitted). 
 223 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 14 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800 (“In general, tax 
claims which are nondischargeable, despite a lack of priority, are those to whose staleness the debtor 
contributed by some wrong-doing or serious fault as, for example, taxes with respect to which the debtor filed 
a fraudulent return.”). 
 224 See IRS Tax Tip 2013-58 (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Eight-Facts-on-Late-
Filing-and-Late-Payment-Penalties (“A failure-to-file penalty may apply if you did not file by the tax filing 
deadline.”) (emphasis added). 
 225 See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012) (stating that an individual who makes willful fraudulent statements on 
a tax return is guilty of a felony). 
 226 I.R.S. Notice, supra note 114. 
 227 IRS Tax Tip 2013-58, supra note 224. 
 228 Id. 
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process relevant to discharge of tax debts, it could have easily done so.”229 
Congress has never mentioned a temporal requirement with regard to 
discharging debt resulting from late-filed tax forms and, given that the 
legislative history does not allude to this conclusion, it is unlikely that 
Congress intended to overhaul the existing caselaw in such a drastic way. If 
Congress intended to codify the one-day-late rule, it could have done so in the 
text of the statute or documented its intention within the legislative history. 
C. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Creates a New Loophole in the Code 
More importantly, the one-day-late interpretation appears to be directly at 
odds with the BAPCPA legislative history. The House Report from the session 
discussing BAPCPA contains language stating that the legislation was passed, 
in part, to close “loopholes and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even 
encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse.”230 Courts following the 
one-day-late rule use this language to argue that allowing individuals to 
discharge debt resulting from late-filed tax forms is the incentive that Congress 
sought to stop.231 This does not make sense considering that the major issue 
regarding dischargeability of tax debt prior to BAPCPA was the issue of post-
assessment filings.232 The loophole in the hanging paragraph that Congress 
likely sought to address was the pre-BAPCPA split where an individual in 
certain circuits could simply not file a return until years after the original 
deadline and roll the dice on eventually receiving a discharge.233 Presumably, 
Congress did not like the idea that the ability to discharge tax debt could hinge 
on the randomness of the IRS actually having had the time and resources to 
 
 229 See In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 230 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92. 
 231 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012).  
 232 Compare In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034–35 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen the debtor has failed to 
respond to . . . deficiency letters sent by the IRS, and the government has assessed the deficiency, then . . . the 
government thereby has met its burden of showing that the debtor’s actions were not an honest and reasonable 
effort to satisfy the tax law.”), with In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006) (“To be a return, a form is 
required to ‘evince’ an honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the laws. This does not require inquiry into the 
circumstances under which a document was filed.”).  
 233 Compare Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 311 B.R. 765, 767 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004) (“By 
reading into the statute a requirement that is not in the text, the Hindenlang line of cases would find tax 
liabilities nondischargeable regardless of their age and regardless of the debtor’s subjective intent when the tax 
returns were filed.”), aff’d, 322 B.R. 118 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 446 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2006), with In re 
Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Debtors like Moroney cannot seek the safe haven of bankruptcy 
by failing to file tax returns, waiting to see if the IRS assesses taxes on its own, and then submitting statements 
long after the IRS has been put to its costly proof.”).  
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assess an individual’s liability prior to that individual filing a bankruptcy 
petition. 
Ironically, the one-day-late rule creates a new loophole that is similar to the 
loophole created by the assessment split. Under the one-day-late interpretation, 
struggling taxpayers who are already late on filing taxes have an incentive to 
further delay filing their tax forms “with the hope that they would be some of 
the lucky few for whom the taxing authorities decide to prepare returns [under 
§ 6020(a)] on the taxpayer’s behalf.”234 The one-day-late interpretation 
therefore simply trades in one loophole that hinged on the IRS having enough 
resources and time to actually assess the liability of every individual who 
failed to file a timely return for a new loophole that hinges on the IRS having 
enough resources and time to assist individuals in filing under § 6020(a). The 
IRS is understaffed and received $1.8 billion dollars less than requested for 
2015.235 Very few people are able to file a return under § 6020(a), largely 
because the IRS has bigger issues to deal with than helping individual debtors 
file late tax forms.236  
Congress likely did not intend for BAPCPA to completely eviscerate the 
Beard test in favor of a system where honest debtors are prevented from 
receiving a discharge largely because the IRS is too busy to assist people in 
filing under § 6020(a). The more likely conclusion is that Congress intended 
for the hanging paragraph to render the post-assessment issue irrelevant by 
codifying the Beard test. The fourth element of the Beard test involves a case-
by-case evaluation, and the fact that an individual failed to file until after the 
IRS notified that individual of his liability would be one fact the court would 
consider when determining if the late-filed form was a return. Under this view, 
a discharge will hinge on whether a debtor made an honest and reasonable 
 
 234 Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 487 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
 235 See Owen Davis, Tax Season 2015: IRS Cutbacks Cripple Taxpayer Services for Poor, Elderly, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/tax-season-2015-irs-cutbacks-cripple-taxpayer-
services-poor-elderly-1871896 (“The number of employees assigned to phones has dropped by 26 percent, and 
they answer fewer than four in ten calls. For the lucky few who do connect with a human, wait times are up 70 
percent from five years ago, and only the most basic tax questions will be answered.”).  
 236 See Robert McKenzie, 7 Million Taxpayers Fail to File Their Income Taxes, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014, 
2:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2014/08/27/7-million-taxpayers-fail-to-file-their-income-
taxes/#3870d10045af (“Although the IRS makes efforts to force non-filers into compliance, the continuing 
improvident cutting of the IRS budget allows more taxpayers to duck their filing obligations because the IRS 
has fewer resources to pursue non-compliant taxpayers.”).  
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attempt to comply with the tax law as opposed to whether the IRS can get 
around to allowing an individual to file under § 6020(a). 
III. INTERPRETING THE AMBIGUITIES OF § 523(A)(*) 
Although courts following the one-day-late rule have determined that the 
phrase “applicable filing requirements” includes the act of late filing, this rule 
is so harsh on debtors that it seems implausible that Congress intended for the 
hanging paragraph to be construed in such a broad manner. 
[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words 
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of 
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such 
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the 
legislator intended to include the particular act.237 
The unnecessarily harsh result of the one-day-late interpretation in light of the 
entire statute, which includes the language discussing § 6020(a) and § 6020(b), 
suggests that further analysis beyond the plain language of the statute is 
necessary to actually discern the purpose of the hanging paragraph. It is 
therefore necessary to consult relevant tools of statutory construction before it 
is possible to ascertain a proper interpretation of the hanging paragraph. 
A. Avoidance of Absurdity 
The one-day-late interpretation leads to the absurd result whereby an 
individual who fails to mail in his or her return until April 16th due to some 
unforeseen illness is punished in the same way that an individual who 
knowingly files a fraudulent return is punished.238 If the oft-stated policy 
behind bankruptcy is to provide a fresh start to the unfortunate debtor, it seems 
unlikely that Congress intended for BAPCPA to preclude debtors who have 
engaged in no willful wrongdoing from receiving a discharge. 
 
 237 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
 238 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (“The McCoy reading of the definition of 
‘return’ would impose the same penalty for blameless failure to file a timely return, such as a debtor who was 
prevented from mailing his return on April 15th because of illness, as would be imposed on a debtor who 
committed an intentional tort.”).  
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Courts following the one-day-late rule claim that Congress’s decision to 
keep the language regarding § 6020(a) tax returns does not render the language 
of the hanging paragraph ambiguous because Congress wanted to offer a 
method for the IRS to encourage uncooperative individuals to file their tax 
returns.239 As the Fifth Circuit suggested in In re McCoy, the reason that 
Congress allowed § 6020(a) forms to be returns for the purpose of this statute 
was presumably to “reward taxpayers who cooperated with the IRS.”240 The 
Fifth Circuit failed to explain, however, how an individual who files accurate 
tax forms one day late is not cooperating with the IRS. In fact, no court 
following the one-day-late interpretation has provided any explanation 
supporting the idea that the hanging paragraph was designed to punish every 
individual who filed late while simultaneously rewarding the small number of 
people whom the IRS decides to allow to file a § 6020(a) return.241 
On a similar note, another confusing result of the one-day-late rule is that  
the scofflaw who sits on his hands at tax time, doesn’t bother to file a 
return, and then, after getting caught, cooperates with the authorities 
and lets the government file the substitute return for him, would be 
the only late filer who would be allowed to discharge his tax debt.242  
Both the IRS and state taxing authorities have the discretion to accept late-filed 
forms without imposing a penalty on the filer.243 Assuming the late filer 
actually provides necessary information to the IRS, which is essential to 
complying with the fourth prong of the Beard test, it does not make sense to 
conclude that the individual has not cooperated with the IRS solely because the 
IRS chose not to allow the filer to file the tax forms under § 6020(a). 
B. Avoid Rendering Other Provisions in the Act Superfluous 
A plain language analysis of § 523(a) should not be restricted solely to the 
language of the hanging paragraph.244 Courts following the one-day-late rule 
 
 239 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (Thompson, J., dissenting); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 
1324 (10th Cir. 2014); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 240 In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931. 
 241 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 15 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 242 Id. at 7 (majority opinion). The First Circuit, which is a one-day-late court, admitted that “[§6020(a)] 
returns are rare, and are allowed only at the IRS’s behest.” Id. 
 243 See IRS Tax Tip 2013-58, supra note 224 (“By law, the IRS may assess penalties to taxpayers for both 
failing to file a tax return . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 244 KIM, supra note 204, at 3.  
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appear to rely almost exclusively on the language of the hanging paragraph, 
however, in reaching the conclusion that late-filed tax forms are not returns.245 
Although the restrictive nature of this analysis is understandable if the court 
was attempting to make a bright-line rule regarding this issue, courts following 
this interpretation fail to take into account the fact that Congress chose not to 
alter § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii), which is known as the “two-year rule.”246 The two-year 
rule allows an individual to discharge a tax debt resulting from a late-filed tax 
form as long as the individual files the tax form more than two years prior to 
filing a bankruptcy petition.247 Adherence to the notion that a court’s plain 
language analysis of a statute must involve analyzing the entire statute also 
makes it difficult to reconcile the one-day-late rule with the fact that Congress 
chose to specifically explain in the hanging paragraph that tax forms filed 
under § 6020(b), which are always filed late, are not returns for 
dischargeability purposes.248 
1. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Renders the Two-Year Rule Nearly 
Meaningless 
The two-year rule, which appears in § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) and has long been 
considered a statutory requirement for receiving a discharge of income tax 
debt, “continues to provide a discharge exception for people who filed their 
taxes late, as long as those debtors did not file [tax forms] within the two years 
just prior to filing for bankruptcy.”249 Prior to BAPCPA, this clause was 
understood to grant debtors the ability to discharge their debt resulting from 
late-filed tax returns as long as the debtor filed the return at least two years 
prior to filing a bankruptcy petition.250 One of the primary interpretative tools 
that courts opposing the one-day-late rule maintain must be consulted is the 
canon that every word in a statute has meaning.251 The majority in In re Mallo 
even noted that, “we construe statutes ‘so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant.’”252 The issue with courts following the one-day-late 
 
 245 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7–10 (majority opinion); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 928–30. 
 246 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 247 See id. 
 248 See id. § 523(a)(*). 
 249 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 250 See In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Furthermore, only taxes for which a 
return was filed more than two years before the petition for bankruptcy are dischargeable.”).  
 251 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 488 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
 252 In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2014).  
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interpretation is that “[i]n adopting the simple rule that a return filed late fails 
the test for dischargeability, we have to ask what happened to the language of 
§ 523(a)(1)(B) that contains not one but two elements to cause a tax, for which 
a return was filed, to be excepted from discharge . . . .”253 While Congress 
could have easily removed or amended the language in § 523(a)(1)(B), the 
decision not to amend this section must be accounted for because courts 
presume that Congress intentionally included every word that appears in a 
statute. The one-day-late rule, therefore, does not appear to be the correct 
interpretation of the hanging paragraph because it renders the two-year rule 
superfluous.  
Prior to BAPCPA, the two-year rule was considered to be expansive and 
courts generally concluded that the rule was designed to include late-filed tax 
forms.254 The Tenth Circuit in In re Mallo attempted to reconcile the hanging 
paragraph with the two-year rule and concluded that Congress left the two-year 
language in the statute to explain that tax forms filed under § 6020(a) will only 
be returns for dischargeability purposes if they are filed two years prior to an 
individual filing for bankruptcy.255 Under the one-day-late interpretation, the 
hanging paragraph causes the two-year rule to be almost entirely meaningless 
because so few individuals are allowed to file under § 6020(a). Courts 
following the one-day-late rule even admit that this interpretation renders the 
two-year rule almost meaningless.256 These courts claim, however, that this is 
acceptable because “while [rendering language] ‘meaningless’ is not okay 
under the cardinal rule disfavoring interpretations that render part of a statute 
superfluous, ‘all but meaningless’ is fine.”257 Courts following the one-day-late 
rule are willing to accept that the two-year rule is rendered almost meaningless 
and that the language concerning § 6020(b) is superfluous so that a bright-line 
rule can be achieved. Thus, the real issue is that the one-day-late interpretation 
simply does too much harm to the plain language of the statute. 
 
 253 King, supra note 173. 
 254 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 523.07. 
 255 774 F.3d at 1324. 
 256 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1323–24. 
 257 Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 489 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
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2. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Renders the Language in the Hanging 
Paragraph Regarding § 6020(a) and § 6020(b) Superfluous 
The hanging paragraph specifically differentiates between § 6020(a) tax 
forms, which are late-filed forms filed by the IRS with the assistance of the 
individual filer, and § 6020(b) tax forms, which are forms filed by the IRS on 
behalf of an individual filer without any assistance from the individual. Under 
the one-day-late rule, § 6020(b) tax forms would clearly not be returns because 
the IRS only files forms on behalf of an individual under § 6020(b) if that 
individual missed the filing deadline and failed to respond to subsequent 
requests from the IRS. As the IRS stated in its notice opposing the one-day-late 
rule, 
[i]f the parenthetical “(including applicable filing requirements)” . . . 
created the rule that no late-filed return could qualify as a return, the 
provision in the same paragraph that returns made pursuant to section 
6020(b) are not returns for discharge purposes would be entirely 
superfluous because a section 6020(b) return is always prepared after 
the due date.258 
Courts following the one-day-late rule dismiss this redundancy as irrelevant 
and suggest that Congress included the language regarding § 6020(b) to clarify 
the statute.259 This interpretation cuts directly against the Supreme Court’s idea 
that “we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment 
which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.”260 
Further, if a § 6020(a) form is the only type of acceptable late-filed form 
under the plain language of the statute, then it would necessarily follow that a 
§ 6020(b) form would have to be the only type of unacceptable late-filed 
form.261 Thus, the only possibilities that do not render the language superfluous 
are either (1) Congress included language regarding § 6020(b) as an example 
of the only type of late-filed form that is not a return; or (2) Congress sought to 
explain that tax forms filed by an individual with the assistance of the IRS (like 
a § 6020(a) form) can be a return, while a tax form filed by the IRS on behalf 
of a non-compliant individual (like a § 6020(b) form) cannot be a return. If the 
one-day-late interpretation is correct, then the first option must be correct or 
 
 258 I.R.S. Notice, supra note 114. 
 259 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7 (citation omitted) (“[W]hatever one thinks of this redundancy, it offers 
too little to parry the force of the observation that a requirement to file on time is a filing requirement”).  
 260 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (citation omitted).  
 261 See supra I.B. 
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the language regarding § 6020(b) will be superfluous. The alternative 
interpretation, which states that late-filed forms can still be a return, is 
therefore likely correct because it allows every word in the statute to have 
meaning and does not render any aspect of the statute superfluous. 
Additionally, the IRS has full discretion to allow individuals to file a 
§ 6020(a) tax form.262 While the majority in In re Fahey found “such 
[§ 6020(a)] returns are rare,” the court provided one example where a debtor 
filed a § 6020(a) return as proof that the one-day-late interpretation is 
correct.263 One example of the IRS allowing an individual to file a § 6020(a) 
return is hardly convincing evidence that Congress intended to make § 6020(a) 
forms the only type of acceptable late-filed returns. Absent any indication 
within the statutory text or the legislative history, it seems strange to conclude 
that Congress intended to leave debtors at the mercy of the IRS in such a way. 
IV. AMENDING THE STATUTE 
Congress could resolve this debate by amending the language of the 
hanging paragraph to clarify which filing requirements are applicable. One 
possible amendment involves substituting the phrase “including an honest and 
reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law” in place of the 
phrase “(including applicable filing requirements).”264 By codifying the fourth 
element of the Beard test, an individual’s debt stemming from a late-filed 
return can only be dischargeable if that individual has met all statutory 
requirements and has not attempted to defraud the IRS in any way. This would 
relieve the In re McCoy court’s worry that individuals are seeking to exploit a 
loophole by filing late because courts would be required to review every case 
where an individual seeks a discharge to ensure that the individual complied 
with the necessary requirements. Filing a form late would therefore not 
inherently be an act of wrongdoing, and an individual would be given an 
opportunity to provide a reason for the failure to file the tax forms in a timely 
manner. This interpretation is more in line with the IRS’s model as well 
 
 262 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7 (“Section 6020(a) is a tool for the IRS, invoked solely at its discretion, 
when it decides obtaining help from the late filing taxpayer is to the IRS’s advantage.”). 
 263 See id. 
 264 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012).  
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because the IRS waives penalties for late filing if the filer can show a reason 
for the late filing.265 
This amendment would not cause issues with the language regarding 
§ 6020(a) and (b) forms because § 6020(b) tax forms involve an act of 
wrongdoing on behalf of the debtor. The IRS only files a § 6020(b) form if an 
individual fails to respond to a notice of deficiency.266 A § 6020(a) form is 
therefore an acceptable type of return because an individual responds to the 
IRS’s request and assists the IRS in filing the § 6020(a) form. A § 6020(b) 
form can never be a return because an individual is refusing to help the IRS file 
his return, so he should not be eligible to benefit from this decision.  
I believe that the notice of deficiency and ability to file § 6020(b) forms are 
the “carrots” that Congress sought to give the IRS to collect unpaid taxes. The 
notice of deficiency is essentially a warning that an individual is about to run 
out of chances to file a tax form without the possibility of further penalties. 
Thus, an individual’s failure to respond to a deficiency notice will lead to the 
IRS filing a § 6020(b) form on behalf of that individual and will preclude that 
individual from receiving a future discharge on his tax debt.  
My interpretation is the inverse of the one-day-late interpretation. Courts 
following the one-day-late rule maintain that the § 6020(a) form should be a 
mechanism by which the IRS chooses who can file their taxes late and still 
receive a discharge.267 It is unclear, however, why the IRS, as opposed to the 
courts, should have this level of power. Leaving this discretion solely to the 
IRS will mainly harm debtors who deserve the opportunity to receive a 
discharge but cannot receive one due to the IRS’s lack of resources. 
Flipping the interpretation so that an individual’s failure to respond to the 
notice of deficiency constitutes an act of wrongdoing, thus precluding a 
discharge, would explain why Congress chose to include the language 
regarding § 6020(a) and (b). The issue Congress wanted to avoid was 
individuals exploiting loopholes in the Code and this interpretation, unlike the 
 
 265 See 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (2012) (“In case of failure to file any return . . . on the date prescribed 
therefor . . ., unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there 
shall be added to the amount required . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 266 See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.  
 267 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7 (“Section 6020(a) is a tool for the I.R.S. invoked solely at its discretion, 
when it decides obtaining help from the late filing taxpayer is to the I.R.S.’s advantage. That Congress left the 
I.R.S. a carrot to offer a taxpayer in such infrequent cases . . . .”). 
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one-day-late rule, gives courts the power to determine when an individual has 
actually committed some act of wrongdoing. Under this interpretation, the 
language regarding § 6020(a) and (b) is necessary in the hanging paragraph 
because it explains that tax forms like § 6020(a), which implicate no act of 
wrongdoing by the filer, are acceptable returns, while tax forms like § 6020(b), 
which implicate failures to respond to the notice of deficiency, are never 
returns. Congress provided an example of a late-filed form where the filer did 
nothing wrong to highlight that late-filed forms can be returns and provided an 
example where a filer committed an act of wrongdoing to show that not all 
late-filed forms will be accepted as returns. Congress did not want to punish 
otherwise honest debtors who file on April 16th. Congress wanted to punish 
debtors who file fraudulent tax forms; file no tax return; or refuse to assist the 
IRS in filing a tax return when given the opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
Individual debtors should not be precluded from receiving a discharge 
solely because they filed a valid tax return late. Although the one-day-late 
interpretation sets up an easy-to-apply framework for determining when a late-
filed tax form is a return, statutory interpretation is not about reaching an easy 
answer. Consequently, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to determine when 
an individual’s late-filed tax form meets the requirements to be a return.268 
Requiring a case-by-case analysis allows a debtor who filed tax forms late to 
still receive a discharge if the debtor can provide evidence that he or she 
attempted to comply with the tax law and prevents a discharge in situations 
where an individual either had no reason to file late or never filed. This 
interpretation balances the IRS’s interest to collect unpaid taxes with both the 
debtor’s interest to receive a fresh start and Congress’s desire to close existing 
loopholes in the Code. Given the numerous ambiguities in the hanging 
paragraph and the policy reasons behind bankruptcy in general, an amendment 
to the statute would help clarify Congress’s intent. 
  
 
 268 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 491 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
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Further, the one-day-late interpretation does too much damage to the 
language of the statute and runs contrary to the principles of bankruptcy law. 
Ignoring the facts that the one-day-late rule renders the § 6020(b) language 
superfluous and eviscerates the two-year rule, the rule is too harsh on honest 
debtors for no justifiable reason. Barring a discharge in situations where an 
individual files a tax form containing all the relevant information one day late 
is an extreme departure from the vast majority of courts’ pre-BAPCPA 
treatment of discharges. Congress never discussed a strict temporal element, 
and courts following the one-day-late rule have gone too far in their plain 
meaning analysis to reach a desired conclusion. 
The IRS’s goal is to accurately assess individuals’ liabilities and collect 
unpaid taxes, while the goal of the Code is to protect creditors and allow 
honest debtors to have a fresh start. Presumably, Congress sought to draft the 
hanging paragraph so that neither debtors nor creditors were put at an inherent 
disadvantage. The one-day-late interpretation is far too harsh on debtors while 
an interpretation suggesting that late filing is completely irrelevant would be 
too favorable to debtors. As a result, courts should factor the debtor’s reason 
for filing late into its analysis of the entire circumstance surrounding the 
debtor’s attempt to comply with the tax laws.269 
Congress wants the IRS to be able to accurately assess taxpayer liability 
and this is best accomplished through a system encouraging individuals to file 
returns even if they miss the original deadline. Additionally, the time at which 
a debtor files a valid tax return has no real effect on the IRS’s ability to achieve 
its goals.270 At the very least, a late-filed form allows the IRS to confirm an 
individual’s liability with complete accuracy. Unlike the one-day-late 
interpretation, which leaves debtors waiting to file in hope that the IRS will 
extend them the chance to file a § 6020(a) return, this alternative interpretation 
addresses the reality of the situation that not all late-filers are created equal.271 
The correct interpretation of the hanging paragraph is therefore that Congress 
intended to codify the Beard test and that every case must be evaluated by the 
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 270 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). 
 271 Compare In re Davis, No. 14-26507 (CMG), 2015 LEXIS 3331, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2015) 
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courts on a case-by-case basis to determine if an individual’s late-filed tax 
form meets the requirements to be a return.272 
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